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Abstract
Cognitive models are used to characterize and understand task performance in hu-
mans. Human behavior often deviates from predictions made by models that assume
perfect rationality. Imposing constraints on cognitive resources, time, and/or infor-
mation, while still assuming optimal function within those bounds, produces better
characterizations of behavior. However, many of the proposed constraints and costs are
ad-hoc and are not derived from fundamental limitations on computation.
We suggest that behavioral performance is limited by the necessity of encoding
and transmitting information about the world in the brain. Encoding information im-
poses a set of intrinsic bounds, defined by signal power, noise power, and knowledge
of environmental statistics, that can be understood and quantified using concepts from
information theory. In this dissertation, we investigate the patterns of behavior that
should arise if cognition is subject to these bounds. Using an information transmission
mechanism built using stochastic processes and Bayesian inference, we show that known
‘laws’ of human behavior, including the Hick-Hyman law and the Power Law of Learn-
ing, are direct consequences of unavoidable limitations on the efficiency of information
transmission.
By instantiating constraints on information transmission in a working system, we
are able to quantify transmission costs induced by task performance. This provides a
unifying and principled explanation of cognitive costs and mental effort: effort arises in
tasks that require expensive information transmission and is reduced through practice
as learned task statistics are exploited to improve efficiency. To test the extent to which
humans exploit task statistics to improve efficiency, we measured behavior on a version
of the N-back task modified to include a predictable structure in target responses. We
found that human data closely matches model predictions, suggesting that humans
integrate information about both task structure and past images to produce responses.
This finding is an experimental validation of our model, and suggests that the N-back
task is more complex than is normally assumed. In sum, we show that treating cognition
as a process constrained by fundamental bounds on information transmission provides
a unified explanation of a wide range of behavioral phenomena.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cognitive science is home to almost as many models as phenomena they are intended to
describe. This circumstance stands in sharp contrast to the physical sciences, in which
scientists strive for and expect simple unifying principles, like Newton’s axiomatic laws,
from which individual phenomena arise as particular circumstantial manifestations. But
where are our first principles, from which we can hope to derive a coherent set of
expectations about how cognition should operate? In cognitive science, we would call
a framework built from axiomatic constraints normative, in that it would make a set
of predictions about how cognition should operate if, in fact, those constraints hold.
Treating cognition as a process operating optimally but within a set of bounds is a
well-established idea [1], but the exact nature of the constraints is still a matter of
debate.
We adopt the perspective, shared by many [2, 3, 4, 5], that cognitive function is
concerned with the storage, maintenance, transfer, and updating of information for
the purpose of acting in the world. Cognitive processes and the observable behavior
they subserve are therefore bound by the constraints inherent in encoding information
about an environment whose properties are only partially known, and transmitting
information in the presence of noise. The implementation of these processes in the
brain is additionally bound by physical constraints, including the availability and use
of energetic resources [6]. In this dissertation, we consider the consequences that these
limitations imply with respect to learning, behavior, and effort allocation. As we will
show, constraining information encoding and transmission leads to the production of
1
2learning rates and patterns of reaction times that closely match known ‘laws’ of hu-
man behavior. It also predicts how behavior should alter when task statistics change,
provides a mechanism for describing which tasks should be effortful, and suggests a
principled connection between the experience of effort and the utilization of metabolic
resources. In short, we adopt a bounded rationality approach in which bounds emerge
from information-theoretic limitations.
In order to connect theoretical constraints to measurable behavior, we introduce
a simple, principled model of information transmission that is built using stochastic
processes, Bayesian inference, and Shannon entropy. The model, which we call the
Bayes-Poisson model, shares certain similarities with a neural rate code, but is intended
to serve purely at David Marr’s algorithmic level of analysis rather than model physical
neurons [7]. Using this model, we are able to reproduce a range of behaviors exhibited
by humans, as mentioned above. Several of these relate to reaction times in tasks.
For example, the Hick-Hyman law describes a phenomenon in which subject reaction
times are linearly related to the entropy of task stimuli [2, 3]. This relationship is
captured by the Bayes-Poisson model, which is also able to account for the observation
that the Hick-Hyman law only holds after extensive task practice. The model produces
log-normal reaction time distributions in which the variance increases with the mean,
a phenomenon widely observed in human subjects, and is also able to produce speed-
accuracy tradeoff curves. In Chapter 2 we describe the Bayes-Poisson model and its
reproduction of human-like patterns of reaction times.
Many of the Bayes-Poisson model’s properties follow from its capturing and main-
taining the relative probability of messages in a prior distribution predicting the next
possible message. The prior acts as information about an upcoming transmission ob-
tained a priori, that is, before the observation in question. As a general rule, the prior
serves to reduce transmission time and increase transmission efficiency: fewer observa-
tions are needed to make a decision, as information about which observations are likely
is already captured by the prior. The process of developing a prior on a new task by
tracking the relatively frequency distribution of messages results in gradually faster av-
erage transmission times. This results in the Power Law of Learning, which we discuss
in greater detail in Chapter 3.
When task statistics change, a strong prior can be maladaptive. If a prior is in
3sudden conflict with task statistics, the Bayes-Poisson model predicts that transmission
times (and error rates) increase. We suggest that this is analogous to the situation
in ‘cognitive control’ tasks, in which conflicting information results in longer reaction
times. In commonly-used tasks such as the Stroop and Flanker tasks [8, 9], conflict re-
sides primarily in the stimulus itself: two conflicting messages are transmitted and must
be disambiguated in order to construct a response. To more closely investigate the role
of compatible and incompatible prior information on response times and error rates, we
constructed a modified version of the N -back task, in which we embedded into some
stimulus blocks a particular statistical structure in target responses. We found that
when structure was present, subjects reacted more quickly and with fewer errors. Con-
versely, when expectation about task structure was suddenly violated, response times
and errors increased. As we describe in Chapter 4, this behavior is closely matched by
the Bayes-Poisson model, but only when structural information is encoded into stimulus
and response priors.
In Chapter 5, we enumerate the array of tasks that produce subjective feelings of
mental effort and fatigue, and suggest that they share a common factor: high infor-
mation transmission costs. One critical benefit of an instantiated model of information
transmission like the Bayes-Poisson model is that it can quantify and measure transmis-
sion cost and relate it to properties like channel noise, receiver entropy, and transmission
time. In the Bayes-Poisson model, transmission cost is measured by the count of spike
events allocated to encoding a signal, driven by a (theoretical) energy allocation rate.
Transmissions that take longer are more costly; this is the case in tasks with high stim-
ulus entropy, or new tasks for which a task-optimized prior has not yet been developed.
It is also the case with conflicting stimuli or maladaptive priors, as mentioned above.
Increasing signal power shortens response times, but at the cost of a higher energy
utilization rate; costs co-vary with transmission time, but are not identical to time.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we discuss the feasibility of a relationship between subjective
experiences of mental effort and the physical energetic costs of cognitive processes. As we
note in Chapter 5, modern accounts of mental effort measure cognitive cost in units that
are external to the decision making system: as negative utility [10], for example, or cost-
of-control [11]. Treating cognitive costs as opportunity costs [12] turns effort allocation
into a constraint in a time- and task-allocation problem, but still does not explain
4why subjects nevertheless use heuristics, exploit task structure, and otherwise choose
to reduce effort within tasks, even when it has no effect on time-on-task. We discuss
the possibility that mental effort is a signal to avoid engagement in tasks that utilize
energetic resources without sufficient concurrent reward. Such frugality of resource
use only makes sense in a context in which resources are limited. We propose that
astrocytic glycogen may play the role of that limited resource, buffering mismatches in
local energy need and energy availability via the bloodstream. Blood glucose may be
practically unlimited, but utilizing glucose at a rate higher than its availability is not.
In summary, we propose that many behavioral phenomena associated with learning
rates, reaction times, and mental effort avoidance can be understood as direct outcomes
of constraints on information encoding and transmission. In addition to providing a
parsimonious generative explanation of a range of behavioral phenomena, our approach
demonstrates a successful application of the information-theoretic principles of entropy
and inference to the analysis of tasks and behavior. Since Claude Shannon introduced
his ‘theory of communication’ in 1948, there has been heated debate over whether the
path between sensing and acting can be treated as a channel, in Shannon’s sense, and
analyzed with the tools he presented [13, 14, 15]. Shannon focused on single-channel
transmissions and placed the burden of constructing efficient codes on the sender. As
we show in Chapter 2, we allow information to be represented by signals across several
channels, analogous to a population rate code across neurons. We also place the bur-
den of controlling transmission duration and increasing transmission efficiency on the
receiver of messages, rather than on the sender. By this shift of perspective, we provide
a mechanism for producing reaction times, error rates, learning rates, and transmission
costs that is consistent with information-theoretic constraints imposed on an intelligent
agent acting in the environment whose statistics are only partially known. We hope our
model will aid in the further application of information-theoretic concepts to the study
of the information transmission in human beings.
Chapter 2
Understanding the timing of
cognitive processes with a
variable-length rate code
2.1 Overview
Cognitive processes all require time, as they universally depend on information trans-
mission between brain regions limited by physical and biological constraints. The time
required for behavior also exhibits surprisingly lawful variation with task demands, suc-
cess and failure, stimulus and response complexity, familiarity, practice, and learning.
Here we consider these regularities as consequences of constraints on information trans-
mission, which we show provide rational predictions for timing effects across a surprising
range of cognitive domains. We use a simple model for neural information transmission
based on a variable-length rate code model built with Poisson processes, Bayesian infer-
ence, and an entropy-based decision threshold that simultaneously reproduces a broad
array of well-known reaction-time effects. By providing a principled connection between
a high-level normative decision framework with time-dependent neural rate codes, we
integrate several disjoint ideas in cognitive science through translating plausible con-
straints into information theoretic terms.
5
62.2 Introduction
Whatever the task at hand, neurons performing task-related computations must infer,
in a continuous-time and streaming manner, which ‘messages’ are being transmitted
from other brain regions [16]. This inference process is noisy, imperfect, and time-
dependent, and enforces a bound on behavioral reaction time to stimuli. Despite the
complex and chaotic nature of neural coding, simple changes in experimental conditions
have consistent and reliable effects on reaction times, described by ‘laws’ like the Hick-
Hyman law [2, 17] and the Power Law of Practice [18]. In this chapter, we consider
information transmission from the environment, through the brain, to behavior as an in-
formation channel using a neural rate code. By constraining both the channel encoding
and each transmitted signal to be optimally inferred under normative assumptions, we
can construct a message-transmission system that replicates these regular phenomena,
and produces human-like response time distributions. Our information-theoretic ap-
proach affords a principled way to connect levels of analysis [7] by integrating energetic
resource availability, message encoding and decoding schemes, and task performance
characteristics into a single framework.
In what follows, we describe a continuous-time variable length coding mechanism,
built using entropy and inference, that adheres to the principles of information theory
while providing predictions of signal transmission time and accuracy. We emphasize that
the continuous-time nature of the code means that signals are not discretized. Because
of this, we are able to transmit messages such that transmission time is linearly related
to message surprisal, mirroring the Hick-Hyman law. By presenting such a code, we
show that many classic findings with respect to reaction time can be explained by a
simple high-level neural model.
2.2.1 Background
The contributions in this chapter are conceptually derived from three concepts: signal
transmission, variable-length codes, and sequential sampling. We begin the chapter
with a brief introduction of each of these concepts.
7Figure 2.1: Discrete symbols are encoded, transmitted through a channel in which
noise is added, and decoded to recover the original symbols. Adapted from [19], with
permission, and inspired by Shannon’s original diagram in [13].
Signal transmission
Signal transmission is an inferential process. In the traditional model of communication
through a channel introduced by Claude Shannon [13], a sender maintains a codebook
composed of a set of symbols they may wish to transmit. Symbols are encoded, either
singly or in blocks, into a form appropriate for the channel (e.g. 1s and 0s for a binary
channel, or into a vector of amplitudes for a Gaussian White Noise channel). During
its transmission through the channel, the encoded signal may be corrupted by noise. A
receiver then observes the noisy transmission and infers the nature of the message as
originally encoded. This scheme is represented in Figure 2.1, redrawn from [19].
The receiver observes a noisy transmission and infers which message from the code-
book was most likely to have generated the observations. In a naive scheme, it can do so
by computing the relative likelihoods of the observations given each possible message,
and finding the message with the highest associated likelihood. We emphasize that this
decoding process happens all-at-once after a message has been received, and is not a
continuous accumulation of information.
The receiver begins each transmission with an initial uncertainty, which Shannon
called ‘entropy’ after the analogous thermodynamic concept, defined by the probability
distribution P over messages X:
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
P (X = x) log2 P (X = x)
8After inference, the receiver’s uncertainty is reduced, but not to zero: the presence of
noise in the channel introduces the possibility of transmission error. Shannon showed
that the probability of transmission error can be reduced by mapping groups of messages
into long ‘blocks’ that are not easily confusable with each other, even when corrupted
by noise. Using this method, Shannon showed that entropy reduction per message, or
entropy reduction per unit of time, can be maximized.
Variable-length codes
Shortly following Shannon’s reconceptualization of signal transmission and uncertainty,
work on data compression led to the invention of variable-length coding schemes. In
a variable-length code, messages are encoded one-by-one rather than combined into
blocks. Encoded message lengths are roughly proportional to the amount of infor-
mation they contain. For single-symbol messages, this means that the length of each
encoded messages is roughly proportional to the message’s surprisal h, defined as h(x) =
− logP (X = x), where P (X = x) is the probability that message x will be transmitted.
A message has low surprisal, and will be short, if it is sent frequently, while infrequent
messages will be longer. By constructing each message’s length to be related to its
frequency of transmission, overall transmission time can be minimized.
Popular implementations of variable-length codes, including the Huffman code and
arithmetic coding [20], are lossless. That is, they allow the original message to be
decoded perfectly from the encoded message. This also implies a complete lack of
noise in the transmission or storage process. We emphasize this, as the variable-length
coding scheme introduced in this chapter allows for variable-length transmissions in the
presence of noise.
Sequential sampling
In 1945, statistician Abraham Wald published a statistical procedure called the ‘se-
quential probability ratio test’ [21]. Wald was interested in making an efficient binary
decision in the presence of an ordered sequence of observations X1...t. Consider the case
in which observations are produced by sampling from two possible states of the world,
A and B. Wald’s goal was to determine, as soon as possible, which state produced
the observations. His method was simple: First, specify allowable false-positive and
9false-negative rates, as this determines the required degree of confidence before making
a decision. Second, calculate the likelihood of observations being produced by each
source, P (X1...t|A) and P (X1...t|B). Third, to test whether A is the source, compare
log
(
P (X1...t|A)
P (X1...t|B)
)
to a pre-specified threshold determined by the desired error rates.
Wald’s mechanism is important here for two reasons. First, Wald introduced a
method for the gradual accumulation of evidence. The drift-diffusion model, commonly
used to model subject response times in two-alternative forced-choice tasks [22], is a
descendent of Wald’s method. Second, though Wald did not have access to Shannon’s
concepts of entropy and decoding, he is nevertheless addressing a situation analogous
to a signal transmission. In Wald’s case, some property of the world constitutes the
message, and observations correspond to the encoded signal. Wald’s test is a decoding
procedure designed to decode messages from the world with a pre-specified error rate.
2.3 Bayes-Poisson coding
In the transmission scheme described in this chapter, messages are encoded by stochastic
processes and transmitted one-at-a-time in the presence of noise. The encoded message
consists of a streaming sequence of observations. To decode each message, the decoder
continually computes the likelihood that the noisy observations are produced by each
possible source message, similar to the decoding process in Shannon’s transmission sys-
tem. Because the observations are streaming, the decoder does not simply select the
most likely message, but tracks a likelihood distribution and updates it over time. The
decoder also maintains a prior distribution over possible messages, and combines the
prior with the computed likelihood to produce a posterior distribution over possible
messages. The entropy of the posterior distribution reflects the decoder’s uncertainty
about the content of the message. This posterior entropy tends to decrease as obser-
vations are made, and the decoder makes a decision about the content of the message
when the entropy reaches a pre-specified threshold.
Like Wald’s procedure, this message transmission system accumulates observations
over time in service of making a decision. However, rather than accumulating evidence
about one of two hypotheses, the decoder accumulates information, in Shannon’s sense
of the word, allowing the decoder to decide between any number of possible messages.
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Figure 2.2: A codebook converts symbols A, B, etc. from a symbol alphabet into
configurations of firing rates across Poisson processes n1, n2, .... In this simple model,
the codebook assigns a signal rate λS to a single Poisson process for a given symbol.
Each Poisson process also emits spikes at a noise rate λN . As Poisson process rates are
additive, this results in a total emission rate of λN + λS for the ‘activated’ process.
The decoder’s prior distribution over possible messages serves as information a priori
about message content. As we will show, this results in variable-length transmissions, in
which messages with higher surprisal, from the perspective of the decoder, take longer
to transmit.
2.3.1 Implementation
We model information transmission by having a sender encode a message into a config-
uration of Poisson process firing rates, and having a decoder watch the generated spikes
until they are confident about the configuration of underlying rates, and thus about the
content of the encoded message.
The transmission mechanism consists of an encoder, a transmitter, a receiver, and a
codebook. The transmitter is an array of Poisson processes, each continuously producing
points or ‘spikes’ independently at a given noise rate λN . This can be viewed as a basic
model of a neural rate code, as neural spike trains are often modeled as Poisson processes
[16]. The symbols to be communicated are taken from an alphabet of discrete symbols
A. The codebook describes a mapping between each symbol and a configuration of
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Figure 2.3: Entropy reduction for an example transmission. (A) Spikes are randomly
emitted by each Poisson process as a function of time. The lower-most Poisson process
is firing at a higher λN + λS rate, while the others are firing at rate λN . (B) The
decoder observes the spikes and infers which process is firing at rate λN + λS . The
initial entropy is 2 bits, indicating an initial belief in equal probabilities for each of
the 4 possible signals. The decoder’s remaining entropy changes as the processes are
observed and the posterior probability of each signal is calculated.
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Figure 2.4: Messages are selected from a source distribution P . The codebook translates
each message into a higher firing rate for a single process (a simplifying, but not re-
strictive, assumption). Poisson processes stochastically emit spikes, which are observed
by the inference process. Bayesian inference combines the prior distribution Q with the
likelihood of each message given the accumulated observations to produce a posterior
distribution over possible messages.
Poisson rates. The mapping from a given symbol to rate configuration is carried out
by the encoder. For the sake of expositional simplicity, we restrict the codebook to
increasing the rate for a single Poisson process from the noise rate λN to a signal rate
λN + λS , as shown in Figure 2.2. The neural analogue is that each Poisson process is
‘tuned’ to ‘prefer’ a particular symbol in a 1-hot manner, resulting in a sparse code.
The receiver observes the sequence of spikes emitting from each Poisson process and
continuously attempts to infer which rate configuration is producing the spikes it ob-
serves, and thereby which symbol is being transmitted. We assume, again for simplicity
and consistent with common information-theoretic analysis, that the receiver knows the
values of both λN and λS . In standard binary or Gaussian channels, transmission is
a discrete vector of amplitudes that takes a fixed time to transmit. Because of this,
practitioners typically speak in terms of transmitting bits-per-signal, or bits-per-second
(which are a constant multiple of each other). In our case, the receiver accumulates
information about each transmission gradually, over time. In effect, observing for a
longer period of time adds redundancy to the signal, decreasing the chance of decoding
error.
13
Figure 2.5: Relationship between signal power and transmission rate. (A) The expected
value of the receiver’s entropy regarding four possible messages decreases as spikes are
observed. Increasing the signal power λS changes the information transmission rate.
(B) Response time distributions vary as a function of signal power λS , and in each case
are well-fit by a log-normal distribution.
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As observations continue, the receiver calculates and continuously updates a pos-
terior probability distribution over possible messages, and stops decoding when the
entropy of the posterior reaches a pre-specified stopping threshold. Let transmitted
symbols be treated as realizations of a random variable X. The receiver begins each
transmission at time t = 0 with an initial uncertainty HQ(X) regarding the symbol
being transmitted, reflecting its prior distribution Q(X) of the possible codewords. As
time passes and observations Yt = {y1, · · · , yt} are made, the receiver uses Bayesian in-
ference to update the prior and obtain a posterior distribution Qt(X|Yt) over messages,
which yields an updated posterior entropy HQt(X|Yt). The posterior entropy decreases
non-linearly with time and reflects the degree of confidence that a message has been
correctly received, as illustrated in Figure 2.5. Transmission stops when HQt(X|Yt)
reaches a pre-set threshold. Figure 2.3 shows the change in posterior entropy over time
for a single transmission.
2.3.2 Computing the posterior
Consider an example in which p1 . . . pn Poisson processes encode a message m1 ∈ A
by increasing the firing rate of process p1 from λN to λN + λS , while leaving all other
processes at rate λN . As specified above, the decoder knows the encoding scheme and
the characteristics of the channel. Using this information, the decoder can calculate the
posterior distribution of possible messages given observations Yt, namely P (m1|Yt) and
each of P (mi 6=1|Yt).
Recall that the likelihood of k being drawn from a Poisson distribution with a rate
parameter λ is given by:
p(k|λ) = (λ)
ke−λ
k!
For a Poisson process, the likelihood distribution for observing k events in t seconds is
similarly:
pt(k|λ) = (λt)
ke−λt
k!
To calculate the likelihood that the message encoded in observations Yt were pro-
duced by m1, the decoder must calculate the probability that the observations from
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process p1 were generated by a Poisson process at rate λN + λS and the observations
from processes p2...n were generated at rate λN . To determine the posterior probability
that message X is m1 using observations Yt, where spike counts from process i by time
t are written as Yit = ki we can use Bayes’ rule and write:
P (X = m1|Yt) = P (Yt|X = m1)P (X = m1)
P (Yt)
(2.1)
=
P (X = m1)
P (Yt)
n∏
i=1
P (Yit = ki|X = m1) (2.2)
= P (Y1t = k1|X = m1)P (X = m1)
P (Yt)
n∏
i 6=1
P (Yit = ki|X = m1) (2.3)
=
((λS + λN )t)
k1e−(λS+λN )t
k1!
P (X = m1)
P (Yt)
n∏
i 6=1
(λN t)
kie−λN t
ki!
(2.4)
Repeating this calculation for each possible message gives a posterior distribution
over all messages:
P (X|Yt) = [P (X = m1|Yt), . . . , P (X = mn|Yt)]
In practice, we avoid computing P (Yt) in the expressions above through normal-
ization of P (X|Yt). The entropy of this expression, namely HPt(X|Yt), is tracked and
compared to a threshold to determine when a message has been successfully decoded.
In the spirit of Wald’s method of evidence accumulation, the burden of delineating an
individual transmission is put on the receiver of a message, rather than on the sender.
This is an important departure from the typical model of information transmission.
2.4 Variable length transmissions and human reaction time
In the coding scheme introduced here, messages are variable-length: transmissions of
messages with higher surprisal takes more time than messages with low surprisal, where
surprisal is calculated using the prior probability distribution Q(X) of the receiver. As
mentioned above, variable-length codes produce codeword lengths (and thus transmis-
sion time of each codeword) that is roughly proportional to the surprisal of the encoded
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symbol in the absence of noise. When symbols are independently drawn according to a
categorical probability distribution, this can manifest in two ways. In the first, increas-
ing the number of possible symbols increases the surprisal of each individual symbol,
and consequently the length of the code needed to encode its value. In the second, sym-
bols drawn from a categorical distribution with unequal probabilities will have different
surprisal values: more frequently transmitted messages will have lower surprisal and
shorter codes than less frequent messages. We performed simulations to explore these
scenarios in turn using our transmission model, and discuss the results in the context
of the work of Hick [2] and Hyman [17].
2.4.1 Variable codebook sizes and Hick (1952)
One of the earliest and most famous applications of Claude Shannon’s “theory of com-
munication” [13] to psychological research was a study that investigated the relation-
ship between task demands and subject response times. In 1952, motivated by earlier
observations that subject reaction times monotonically increase with the number of al-
ternative responses in a task, William Hick performed a series of experiments in which
he investigated the degree to which subject response time was related to the Shannon
information of the source stimulus [2]. Hick arranged 10 pea lamps in a quasi-circular
pattern, and instructed subjects (of which he was one) to gaze at the lamps, while their
fingers rested on an array of “Morse keys”. At regular intervals, one of the lights would
be illuminated, and subjects were instructed to press the corresponding key. Lights were
illuminated in “batches”, and for each batch only a subset of lights were illuminated.
Hick called this count the ‘degree of choice’ for that batch. For example, in the batch
for which the degree of choice was 3, only one of three lights would ever be illuminated.
In each case, lights were illuminated with equal probability, so that the information
represented by each illumination is h(x) = log 1P (X=xi) = log n, where n was the degree
of choice for the given batch.
Hick found that, at least for the two subjects who participated in the experiment,
the following relationship held:
RT = 0.518 log10 (n+ 1)
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Figure 2.6: Early work by Hick [2] illustrates a logarithmic relationship between source
entropy and response time, or a linear relationship between information acquisition and
response time, following extensive practice. Figure replotted from [2].
.
Hick concluded that response times to stimuli were determined by the amount of un-
certainty (that is, entropy) in the stimulus. The +1 inside the logarithm provides a
better fit for the data than merely log10 n, and Hick justifies its inclusion by saying that
subjects must know when a light is illuminated in addition to which light is illuminated,
which is a source of extra information. Hick’s ‘provisional conclusion that information
is gained at a constant rate’ is known as ‘Hick’s law’ or the ‘Hick-Hyman’ law. To
re-phrase his conclusion, transmission time is proportional to entropy reduction.
2.4.2 Simulating the Hick-Hyman law
We simulated a scenario analogous to Hick’s experiment by varying codebook sizes and
recording transmission times using a pre-set entropy threshold and a uniform source
distribution. The nonzero entropy threshold occasionally results in transmission errors,
as we see in human subjects. Information transmitted is thus less than the surprisal of
each individual message, on average. We computed actual information transmitted by
calculating the mutual information between transmitted symbols and received symbols,
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Figure 2.7: Mean transmission time increases logarithmically with codebook size and
linearly with information transmitted, mirroring the Hick-Hyman law. Points represent
mean transmission times and shaded regions represent the 50% and 90% high-density
interval of the transmission time distribution. In each case, messages were transmitted
according to a discrete uniform distribution P (X) over messages, and the receiver main-
tained a uniform prior distribution Q(X) = P (X) of the same dimensionality. For each
transmission, an entropy threshold of 0.3 bits was used, with λS = 16 and λN = 10,
though different rates produce different time scales. Compare with Figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.8: Results from Hyman (1953). Hyman found a remarkably linear relationship
between stimulus entropy and response time under three different experimental condi-
tions [17]. Hyman varied the number, relative probability, and sequential probability of
stimuli in experiments 1, 2, and 3. Here, results from experiments 1 and 2 are re-plotted
from [17].
for each codebook size. The results are shown in Figure 2.7 and are a close qualitative
match for the Hick-Hyman observations of human response times reported in [2] and
[17].
2.4.3 Non-uniform source distributions and Hyman (1953)
The next year, Ray Hyman at John’s Hopkins University expanded on Hick’s obser-
vations [17]. In addition to replicating Hick’s finding that entropy varied with the
logarithm of stimulus choices, Hyman tested two other mechanisms of entropy ma-
nipulation. First, he varied the probability distribution of stimuli, and measured the
response times produced by non-uniform stimulus distributions. Second, he introduced
sequential dependencies between stimulus presentations, by which any given stimulus
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could be predicted, at least in part, by the preceding stimulus. Hyman showed that
these other two sources of entropy manipulation produced precisely the same pattern
of results, as shown in Figure 2.8.
2.4.4 Simulating Hyman’s findings
We simulated a scenario similar to Hyman’s second experiment from [17], in which
he manipulated the source distribution of stimuli. To do this, we transmitted mes-
sages drawn from a non-uniform distribution P (X) and measured transmission time
for each message. For each transmission, we measured the information transmitted by
comparing the receiver’s prior probability distribution Q(X) (which equals the source
distribution P (X), a critical assumption in Hyman’s interpretation of his results) with
its posterior distribution Q(X|Y ) at decision time. We measured the difference in
these distributions using the Kullback–Leibler divergence between the two distribu-
tions, DKL(Q(X|Y )||Q(X)). The change between the receiver’s prior and posterior
distributions is the decrease in the receiver’s subjective uncertainty about which mes-
sage is being transmitted. From the point of view of the receiver, this is equivalent to
the amount of information transmitted, in bits. Figure 2.9 shows a linear relationship
between message surprisal and transmission time, again qualitatively matching Hyman’s
reported results from human subjects shown in Figure 2.8.
2.4.5 Speed-accuracy trade-off
Mapping the trade-off between speed and accuracy is a common method for characteriz-
ing subject performance on tasks: subjects can favor speed over accuracy or vice versa,
but their responses land on a characteristic curve describing an inherent trade-off [23].
The presence of motivational incentives can shift the shift the speed/accuracy trade-off
curve in some cases [24].
We produce speed-accuracy trade-off curves by simulating transmissions with vary-
ing entropy thresholds for each of five different signal powers. The accuracy and av-
erage transmission times are plotted in Figure 2.10, and show a human-like trade-off
between speed and accuracy under identical transmission conditions. Moreover, the
speed-accuracy curve shifts in a predictable way in response to signal power allocation,
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Figure 2.9: Mean transmission time increases linearly with actual information transmit-
ted, echoing similar findings in humans by Hyman in [3]. The quantity of information
transmitted is calculated as the the KL-divergence between the prior distribution Q(X)
and the posterior distribution Q(X|Y ) at decision time. Messages were drawn from a
non-uniform source distribution P (X). The receiver is assumed to know this source
distribution and maintains a prior distribution Q(X) = P (X). For each transmission,
an entropy threshold of 0.3 bits was used, with λS = 4 and λN = 10. Compare with
behavioral results in Figure 2.8, though note that only mean values are provided in
behavioral data and variation in trial-by-trial performance is not reported.
.
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Figure 2.10: Increasing signal power λS shifts the speed/accuracy trade-off curve. Each
curve is generated by simulating 2000 transmissions with a fixed entropy threshold. As
the entropy threshold is changed, both average response time and transmission accuracy
(measured as rate of correctly decoded messages) change. Simulations were performed
with a noise rate λN of 10 spikes/s and an initial receiver entropy of 2 bits.
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presenting a principled hypothesis for the mechanism of speed-accuracy curve shifts in
humans.
2.5 Discussion and conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a simple message transmission mechanism, which we call
Bayes-Poisson coding, that allows information transmission in the presence of noise.
Bayes-Poisson coding can be considered as a simple model of a neural rate code, but
only at the computational and algorithmic levels of analysis [7]. We are not attempting
to model physical neurons, but instead wish capture high-level and commonly observed
properties of behavior: reliable distributions of response times, increased response times
with task complexity, decreased response times with practice (see Chapter 3), and a
speed-accuracy trade-off. Many of these are ubiquitous enough to have associated ‘laws’,
which our transmission model reproduces.
Demonstrating the possibility of variable-length transmissions in a noisy environ-
ment addresses a longstanding concern with the application of information-theoretic
ideas to the study of psychology. Central to this reservation appears to be a concern
that Shannon’s proofs of the existence of maximally efficient binary codes rely on his
use of ‘block codes’, in which several messages are combined into a single string in a
way that increases the likelihood of error-free transmission [20]. For example, Luce [15]
writes that “Shannon’s way of defining the concept [of channel capacity] requires that
not individual signals be transmitted but rather very long strings of them so as to be rid
of redundancies. That is rarely possible within psychological experiments.” Another re-
cent paper raises similar concerns that Shannon’s method of encoding “requires complex
computation and long delays to encode and decode in ways that achieve optimality”,
and that it only “applies to settings of perfect signal recovery, which may not be possible
or even desirable in biological settings” [25]. It is not clear how apply Shannon’s ideas
of how to achieve channel capacity to psychological processes, the argument goes, so
perhaps Shannon’s ideas are not applicable in the study of psychology.
Concerns about the applicability of Shannon’s proofs to information transmission in
the brain confuse levels of analysis [7], and wrongly fixate on a supposed requirement for
at-capacity information transmission. It is true that Shannon’s reliance on block-coding
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to achieve efficient information transmission is an implementation-level detail applicable
to discrete-time codes and does not apply to the communication of information between
neurons. However, the core conceptual contribution of information theory lies not in
coding techniques but in providing a method for quantifying uncertainty. More broadly,
it serves to characterize the ways in which noise and redundancy affect the reliability,
efficiency, and rate of inference. From this broader perspective, it is surely applicable
to the study of cognitive function. We have shown that by utilizing the information-
theoretic principles relevant to a continuous-time system (in particular entropy and
inference), and avoiding those that are not (block-coding), we can produce a simple and
parsimonious explanation of a wide range of phenomena.
As with source-coding systems, expected message transmission times are faster when
more frequently transmitted messages are transmitted in less time than less frequently
transmitted messages. In the Bayes-Poisson model, this is implemented by tailoring the
receiver’s prior distribution Q to match, as closely as possible, the source distribution
P . This reveals an epistemic problem from the perspective of the receiver, which has no
a priori knowledge of the source distribution: the prior must be learned and updated
by observing message transmissions.
The work of Hick and Hyman has been legitimately criticized for omitting this dis-
cussion [14]. In light of our model, Hyman’s results only make sense if we assume that
subjects knew, or had a good approximation of, the relative frequency of messages.
Fortunately, we can assume that this is the case: Hyman had subjects practice exten-
sively, and collected 15,000 reaction times per subject over 3 months. Though we do not
have access to the data, we predict that Hyman’s subjects responded to each stimulus
with roughly equivalent reaction times at the beginning of training, and that differenti-
ated reaction times arose only after practice. We discuss the relationship between task
practice and transmission duration in detail in Chapter 3.
2.5.1 Relationship to the drift-diffusion model
The Bayes-Poisson model contains certain similarities to the drift-diffusion model com-
monly used to model two-alternative forced-choice tasks [22], but also important dif-
ferences. Both models track an internal state toward a threshold, and crossing that
threshold produces a correct or incorrect action. However, our model treats the source
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of noise as internal to the decision-making process, whereas the drift-diffusion model is
commonly used to model noise in the stimulus itself. In the Bayes-Poisson model, mes-
sages are models for categorical stimuli, and are static and unambiguous. Yet by includ-
ing stochasticity in the transmission process itself, we produce errors and response time
distributions that closely match human data. Second, our model is explicitly Bayesian.
Rather than track a log likelihood ratio over two choices, tracking the entropy of a pos-
terior distribution allows us to model tasks in which there are several possible stimuli
and several choices, something the drift-diffusion model does not afford. Third, the
drift-diffusion model assumes that the likelihood ratio threshold is adjusted to match
a specified accuracy, which implies a certain omniscience over the long-term averaged
outcomes of experimental trials by the subject. In contrast, entropy over the observed
stimulus and correct response is a subjective quantity that can reasonably be tracked
and updated by the subject. As we show in Chapter 4, even with a fixed entropy
threshold, the model produces variations in response accuracy that depend on the prior
– and these variations match human variation in task performance under the same task
conditions. Finally, explicitly representing prior information as prior distributions is
conceptually clearer than including a biased starting point in a drift-diffusion model.
2.5.2 Experimental predictions
The value of a model lies not only in its ability to parsimoniously explain a range of
phenomena, but also in its ability to make correct predictions about new or previously
unexplained data. In this chapter we have focused on a description of the model and the
unified explanation it provides for a range of psychological findings related to reaction
times. In Chapter 4, we model subject behavior in a novel variant of the N -back
task, and show that the model makes quantitatively correct predictions about both
subject accuracy and response time as a function of experimental manipulations of task
structure.
2.5.3 Limitations and future work
The signal transmission model presented here, while able to reproduce an array of
experimental findings, has several simplifications and possibilities for extension. The
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first is that messages need not be mapped in a ‘1-hot’ manner to Poisson process firing
rates. This mapping represents one possible embedding of discrete symbols into vectors
of firing rate configurations, but not the only one, and nothing in our model requires
that use of a 1-hot embedding. As in traditional information theoretic analyses, good
signal design requires that signals be minimally confusable and therefore ‘far apart’ in
some representation space. When the number of messages is greater than the number
of neurons, 1-hot coding is obviously impossible, and a mechanism would be needed
for determining an optimal embedding of messages to rates. Conversely, it is presently
unclear what an optimal coding scheme would be when the number of messages is
far lower than the number of available Poisson processes. Sparse coding may still be
preferable, but placing a rate cap on individual processes (analogous to a maximum
signal power, a common constraint in Gaussian channels) may lead to sparse-like codes
that are not 1-hot. This represents an interesting avenue for future investigation.
As presented in this chapter, we assume that the alphabet of possible messages is
the same for the encoder and decoder. This constraint was imposed for simplicity, but
makes it difficult to apply the model to many cognitive tasks, in which stimulus-response
mappings are often many-to-few. The constraint is not necessary for the model, however,
and in Chapter 4 we show how the model can be applied to understand response times
and accuracy rates in the N -back task. When many stimuli are mapped to few actions,
the entropy over appropriate actions, rather than over stimuli, is the quantity that
must be tracked to successfully model observed behavior. This architecture affords a
desirable separation of concerns between sender and receiver: the sender merely relays
information about the environment, while the receiver and actor specify the confidence
required to adequately perform the task at hand.
Most importantly, we currently lack a closed-form relationship between model pa-
rameters of signal power, noise power, alphabet size, entropy threshold, and message
priors to the measurable outputs of response time and accuracy. Obtaining a closed
form relationship, as exists for the drift-diffusion model between drift rate and response
time, would afford Bayesian inference of individual subject parameters. It would also
afford Bayesian model comparison of this model with other models of response time, an
important technique for comparing the relative merit of competing models in accounting
for experimental observations on individual tasks.
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2.5.4 Conclusion
In closing, we have have introduced a principled model of information transmission,
built using stochastic processes, Bayesian inference, and entropy. Our model accounts
for response times as a function of both message cardinality (i.e. task complexity) and
prior experience. The model incorporates the relationship between response time and
response accuracy by using a simple entropy stopping threshold. Finally, we showed
that the Hick-Hyman Law, log-normal response time distributions, and speed-accuracy
trade-offs are all produced through placing normative bounds on the inference of source
distributions and the content of individual signals. As we will discuss in Chapter 3,
limited knowledge about the relative frequency of each message also places a bound on
transmission efficiency, with efficiency increases mirroring the Power Law of Practice.
Chapter 3
Learning effects arise from
task-indexed adaptive coding
3.1 Overview
The brain is tasked with transmitting information quickly and reliably while limiting
energy use. It must encode information without perfect knowledge of stimulus statistics,
making efficient encoding impossible. We consider the possibility that the brain learns
task-specific codes on-line, and that the efficiency of these codes can increase with
exposure to task statistics. Use of task-indexed codes would parsimoniously explain,
from information theoretic first principles, a ubiquitous response time improvement
during task learning called the Power Law of Learning. We also consider the implications
of task-specific codes on automaticity and cognitive costs.
3.2 Introduction
Learning is characterized by adaptations of behavior which are typically assessed as
increases in accuracy. During learning, however, reaction times often continue to im-
prove after accuracy saturates [26]. Learning theories based on Bayesian statistics make
predictions about changes in accuracy [27], but do not explain continued improvements
in timing after accuracy saturates. We propose that improvements in response time
can be explained by learning to efficiently transmit state information. We thus make
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a novel proposal: learning involves both improving accuracy and finding efficient codes
for transferring information within the brain. Using tools from information theory to
instantiate this assumption, we explain how the brain could learn a code with respect
to a new task; this predicts the Power Law of Learning, an power-law decay in reaction
time with practice. To our knowledge, existing accounts of practice curves for response
time and accuracy are either merely descriptive [18] or are part of mechanistic cogni-
tive architectures (e.g. ACT-R [28], the instance theory of automatization [29, 30], or
chunking [31, 32]).
We start with a description of a problem the brain must solve: transferring infor-
mation about the state of the world from sensory areas to action selection areas, i.e.
across an information channel. In order to transmit this information quickly, the brain
should construct an efficient code of state information, which in turn depends on stimu-
lus statistics and must be learned. When encountering a new task, subjects must learn
many things, including which sensory information in the environment is relevant to the
task (feature extraction) and which actions provide the highest reward rate over time
(policy learning) as a function of time-varying circumstances (state representation).
Efficiently transferring and updating state information is a problem distinct from these.
The current investigation can be seen as an application of the Efficient Coding
Hypothesis (ECH) to the time scale of task learning. First proposed in the 1960s, ECH
suggests that the brain develops codes designed to transmit the maximum amount of
information with the fewest neural spikes [33]. This hypothesis has been supported by
evidence from the visual system of the fly [34], the primate visual area V1 [35], and the
retina of macaques and salamanders [36]. In each case, an efficient coding scheme is
constructed using knowledge of stimulus statistics, which are learned on evolutionary
or developmental time scales [37]. We propose that an analogous situation pertains to
task-related information learned on-line during task engagement.
In what follows, we introduce our proposal using relevant concepts from information
and control theory. We describe an ideal-observer model of the efficient transmission
problem, and show that learning an efficient encoding gives rise to curves that qualita-
tively match practice curves seen in the literature (see Figure 3.3). We include a simple
worked example with numerical simulations to demonstrate the production of response
time curves as a function of coding efficiency, and show that these curves arise from
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Figure 3.1: (A) Typical decision making models involve transforming observations into
a state, and then using the state to select an action. (B) We claim that the transmission
of state information to the action selection mechanism is subject to the constraints of
information transmission: the state must be encoded and transmitted through a noisy
channel. This figure is adapted from [19], with permission. (C) Taken together, we
propose a refined model of action selection that accounts for transmission time, which
provides a normative explanation for practice effects. State information s is encoded
using a task-specific encoding (gQT for a task T ) using an approximation Q of the state
frequency distribution P . The efficiency of this encoding depends on the quality of the
estimate Q.
Binomial, Categorical, and Gaussian stimulus distributions. Finally, we show that the
Power Law of Learning is produced by the Bayes-Poisson code introduced in Chapter 2.
We discuss the relationship between the current work and adaptive codes in the visual
system, as well as implications for understanding automaticity and cognitive costs.
3.3 Efficient state encoding
When behaving on-line in an ecological environment, an organism must represent envi-
ronmental information sufficient to afford action selection. We assume that this infor-
mation must be transmitted from the senses, through the brain, which will eventually
result in an action. In this context, the brain acts as an information channel, transmit-
ting information between sensory input and action output.
While our approach is reminiscent of applications of information theory to psychol-
ogy from the 1950s and later (see [5] for a review), we explicitly restrict ourselves to
David Marr’s computational level of analysis [7], in which we investigate the problem the
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Figure 3.2: (A) Response time is composed of fixed time costs (including the cost
of efficiently transmitting state information), plus extra transmission time due to use
of an inefficient code, which decreases with practice. (B) This figure shows change
in KL(P ||Q) as flips of a biased coin are observed, averaged across many subjects.
KL(P ||Q) measures the inefficiency of state encoding, and decreases linearly in log-
log space. This mirrors the Power Law of Learning, an example of which is shown in
Figure 3.3. Grey lines represent 1 SE of non-transformed values. (C) A strong, incorrect
prior on the state frequency distribution initially slows learning. Each line represents a
different strength prior belief that a biased coin is actually unbiased. (D) The power-law
relationship holds for observations of state spaces following Binomial, Categorical, and
Gaussian distributions. In each simulation, values are averaged across 2000 simulated
subjects.
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brain is trying to solve: transmitting stimulus information quickly over a finite-capacity
channel.
Problem description
We borrow from control theory and say that information about the world is compressed
into a state s, where the space of possible states S and the world-information-to-state
mapping are determined by the task being performed. Once the value of the state s is
computed (say, for a single trial of an experiment), it must be transmitted to an action
selection mechanism. In order to be transmitted over a channel, s must be encoded into
a form transmissible by the channel medium (in this case, the brain). In accordance
with the computational level of analysis, we need make no claim about the form of the
code, except to point out that that the same information can be transmitted using either
efficient or inefficient codes. Nevertheless, at the end of the current chapter we discuss
how the application of efficient coding principles to the Bayes-Poisson code introduced
in Chapter 2.
We treat the state as drawn from a probability distribution P (S). In general, the
quantity of information that must be transmitted in order to specify the state is equiv-
alent to the entropy of the state space:
H(S) = −
∑
s∈S
P (S = s) log2 P (S = s)
In an efficient variable-length code, the average code length assigned to each value of
s is proportional to − log2 P (S = s). As such, constructing an efficient code requires
knowledge of the distribution of P (S) [20].
Inefficient code length
Critically, P (S) must be learned from experience, as individuals engaged in a new task
do not know the state frequency distribution. An inefficient coding of a state s will
result in a longer transmission than an efficient code. Assume that an inefficient code
is constructed using an estimate of the state space distribution Q(S). The extra code
length is defined by the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the two distributions,
usually written as DKL or KL:
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KL(P ||Q) =
∑
s∈S
P (S = s) log2
P (S = s)
Q(S = s)
As an individual performing a task observes more realizations of the stimulus state,
they can update Q, and with many observations KL(P ||Q) → 0. This in turn allows
the subject to construct an (approximately) efficient code, transmit state information
in a minimum amount of time, and select an action more quickly. Thus, reaction times
directly depend on the efficiency of state encoding.
A simple example
Suppose an individual is engaged in a task in which they observe the outcome of a coin
flip. They are instructed to press a left arrow key if they observe heads, and a right arrow
key if they observe tails. The image of a coin must be processed visually and turned
into a state s ∈ S (object recognition or feature extraction), and the mapping between
flip outcome and response is learned (policy learning). These processes contribute to
response accuracy. In addition, the state of each flip must be encoded and transmitted
through the brain to an action selection mechanism that in turn drives a key press. This
second process contributes to response time.
Suppose the probability of a biased coin landing on heads was P (S = heads) =
0.9, and each flip is modeled as being drawn from a Bernoulli distribution. For an
unbiased coin, the stimulus encoder mechanism (sender) could transmit log2 2 = 1 bit
of information to the action selector mechanism (receiver). If the sender knew the
bias of this particular coin, it would only need to transmit H(S) = −(0.9 log2 0.9 +
0.1 log2 0.1) = 0.47 bits, on average, to specify the outcome of each coin flip.
Assume that the sender has a prior belief that the coin is unbiased, and thus has
an estimate Qinit of P . This subjective ignorance means that the sender is unable to
construct an optimal code. Hence, the sender would construct a code that requires 0.53
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Figure 3.3: The Power Law of Learning, also called the Power Law of Practice, de-
scribes a power-law relationship between practice trials and response times. Given the
inherent noise in behavioral data and variable learning rates of individuals, the Power
Law is only apparent after averaging across subjects. However, the trend holds for a
surprisingly wide range of tasks, including reading inverted text, scanning for visual
targets, performing geometry proof justification, mirror tracing, and more. See [18] for
a review. Figure was replotted from [18], which reported data from [38].
extra bits, on average, to communicate the outcome of a coin flip:
KL(P ||Qinit) =
∑
s∈S
P (S = s) log2
P (S = s)
Q(S = s)
=0.9 log2
0.9
0.5
+ 0.1 log2
0.1
0.5
=0.53
3.3.1 Power Law of Learning
As the sender observes more coin flips, its estimate Qinit of P improves to Qobs, and
the sender’s code becomes more efficient. To investigate the characteristics of this
update, we simulated 10,000 coin flips for each of 2,000 subjects. For each flip we
calculated the maximum likelihood estimate Qobs of P using every observed flip to that
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point, effectively incorporating observations into the count parameters of a Dirichlet
distribution. We then calculated KL(P ||Qobs), and averaged the KL-divergence across
all subjects for each number of flips. Results are shown in Figure 3.2. When subjects
have a weak prior, the code length improvement has a linear relationship with stimulus
observations when plotted in log-log space, exactly like the Power Law of Learning [18].
However, the initial rate of average code length decrease depends on the strength of
subjects’ prior beliefs that the coin is unbiased. Code length improvement rates as a
function of prior strengths are shown in Figure 3.2C.
In our simulations, the power-law relationship is clearest when our virtual subjects
have weak priors on stimulus statistics. Accordingly, we suspect that the Power Law
of Learning arises as an experimental result exactly because this is akin to the scenario
in many psychology experiments, in which subjects are unfamiliar with the task and
have a weak prior on stimulus statistics. The existence of strong, incorrect prior beliefs
results in qualitatively different learning curves, an experimentally testable prediction.
Generalizability
In the coin flip example, we focus on encoding the value of draws from a Bernoulli dis-
tribution and show power-law decreases in transmission time. In Figure 3.2D, we show
similar results for both Categorical (k = 16) and univariate Gaussian distributions.
These simulation results suggest that the trend may not depend on the specific param-
eters or form of the state distribution. Interestingly, each case results in a power-law
exponent of -1. Power law fits to response time curves in the experimental literature
give exponents between 0 and -1 [18], indicating a slower rate of learning in real sub-
jects than the ideal observer model presented here. See Section 3.3.2 below for related
discussion.
Aggregating across subjects
In the psychology literature, the smooth linear curves described by the Power Law of
Learning arise as a result of averaging across many subjects. This observation has
been leveled against Power Law of Learning as a criticism [39], but as we show below,
this power-law decay is an effect of aggregating many subject response times when
each subject is learning optimally. Indeed, an organism using efficient coding should
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have trial-to-trial response time variance related to both their updated code and the
information content (‘surprise’) of each observed state. In other words, each subjects’
trend during learning is not expected to be smooth. The between-subject variance of
simulated response times is shown as vertical gray lines in Figure 3.2B.
3.3.2 Learning rates
In each of the simulations presented above, the slope of the Power Law line is -1,
indicating a power-law decay exponent of -1. As mentioned above, exponents recorded
in the literature are exclusively between 0 (no learning) and -1 (presumably, a maximum
learning rate). Table 3.1 from [18] shows several experimentally determined learning
rates.
The exponent of the power-law, and consequently the learning rate and slope of the
log-log plot, varies if we implement an anchoring bias [40] in the distribution update
step. In doing so, we are suggesting that distribution updates are conservative. As noted
above, we estimate the distribution Q by observing categorical counts, and updating the
count parameters in a Beta or Dirichlet prior distribution over proportions. In a fully
Bayesian update, each observation causes the corresponding parameter to increment by
1, giving a new maximum likelihood estimate of the relevant proportions.
In order to implement an anchoring bias, we perform a recursive anchored update
of outcome proportions after each observation. To follow the coin-flip example, suppose
we have a Bernoulli proportion p, and a set of N observations, of which H are heads.
At each time step t, the update step is as follows. Let our new observation Y = 1 if the
observation at time step t is heads, and Y = 0 otherwise. For a fully Bayesian update,
a recursive update form would be:
pt+1 =
ptN + Y
N + 1
In this formulation, the numerator represents the past count of ‘heads’ observations,
plus the value of the new observation Y . The denominator represents the count of total
observations, plus one new observation. An anchored update in the same form is as
follows:
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Data Set B α
Snoddy (1926) 79.20 .26
Crossman (1959) 170.1 .21
Kolers (1975) - Subject HA 14.85 .44
Neisser et al. (1963)
Ten targets 1.61 .81
One target .68 .51
Card, English & Burr (1978)
Stepping keys - Subj. 14 4.95 .08
Mouse - Subj. 4 3.02 .13
Seibel (1963) - Subject JK 12.33 .32
Anderson (Note 1) - Fan 1 2.358 .19
Moran (1980)
Total time 30.27 .08
Method time 19.59 .06
Neves & Anderson (1980)
Total time - Subject D 991.2 .51
The Game of Stair
Won Games 1763 .21
Lost games 980 .18
Hirsch (1952) 10.01 .32
Table 3.1: Experimentally measured power-law slopes. Reproduced in part from [18].
Parameters correspond to the power-law equation T = BN−α, where N represents
practice trials, T is response time, and B and α are constants. All power law slopes,
indicated by α in the table, are between 0 and -1.
pt+1 = (1− α)pt + α ·
(
ptN + Y
N + 1
)
Here, we start with the old term, and add a weighted difference between the full
updated value and the old value. When the weighting term α = 0, we have pt+1 = pt
for each iteration, and no learning occurs. When α = 1, we obtain the full update:
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Figure 3.4: Varying the level of anchoring controls the learning rate, as reflected in the
slope of the log-log plot.
pt+1 = (1− α)pt + α ·
(
ptN + Y
N + 1
)
(3.1)
= 0 · pt + 1 · ptN + Y
N + 1
(3.2)
=
ptN + Y
N + 1
(3.3)
Figure 3.4 shows power-law slopes for varying values of α. Leider et al. [41] suggest
that such anchored adjustments may represent an optimal strategy when updates are
costly. If so, α would be inversely related to the update cost.
Updating the proportion pt of ‘heads’ and ‘tails’ can be equivalently written as a
partial update to both heads and tails counts. Let Ht and Tt be the count of heads and
tails, respectively, at time t. Letting Y = 1, indicating a flip of heads, we can re-write
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the update above as:
pt+1 = (1− α)pt + α ·
(
ptNt + 1
Nt + 1
)
(3.4)
Ht+1
Nt + 1
= (1− α)Ht
Nt
+ α
Ht
Nt
Nt + 1
Nt + 1
(3.5)
(3.6)
Multiplying by Nt + 1 gives:
Ht+1 = (1− α)Ht(Nt + 1)
Nt
+ α
Ht + 1
Nt + 1
(Nt + 1) (3.7)
=
Ht(1− α)(Nt + 1)
Nt
+ α(Ht + 1) (3.8)
=
Ht(Nt + 1− αNt − α)
Nt
+ α
HtNt +Nt
Nt
(3.9)
=
HtNt +Ht − αNtHt − αHt)
Nt
+
αHtNt + αNt
Nt
(3.10)
=
HtNt +Ht − αHt + αNt
Nt
(3.11)
= Ht + α+ (1− α)Ht
Nt
(3.12)
When α = 1, the new count becomes Ht+1 = Ht + 1, as described above. Criti-
cally, we enforce the total added count across all outcomes to sum to 1. Not enforcing
the incremental count updates to add to 1 destroys the power-law relationship. The
corresponding update for the count of tails:
Tt+1 = Tt +
(
1− (α+ (1− α)Ht
Nt
)
)
(3.13)
Notice that when α = 0, Ht+1 = Ht+
Ht
Nt
. As this update has a corresponding update
for tails of Tt+1 = Tt + (1− HtNt ), the relative proportion of heads does not change:
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Ht+1
Nt + 1
=
Ht+1
Ht+1 + Tt+1
(3.14)
=
Ht +
Ht
Nt
Ht +
Ht
Nt
+ Tt + (1− HtNt )
(3.15)
=
NtHt +Ht
Nt
· 1
Ht + Tt + 1
(3.16)
=
Ht(Nt + 1)
Nt(Ht + Tt + 1)
(3.17)
=
Ht(Nt + 1)
Nt(Nt + 1)
(3.18)
=
Ht
Nt
(3.19)
(3.20)
A similar computation can be performed for the proportion of tails. Performing
count updates by distributing evidence from an observation across multiple counts can
be thought of as a noisy update, where the fact of an observation is recorded but its
allocation to count parameters is determined by some learning rate – in which case,
the learning rate might be better thought of as a evidence attribution effectiveness. It
is interesting that anchored updating, which is typically interpreted as a bias resulting
from costly updates, can be re-written in terms of evidence attribution.
3.3.3 The Power Law of Learning in the Bayes-Poisson code
In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that the time taken to transmit a signal using the
Bayes-Poisson code was related to the degree of change in belief by the receiver of a
message about the message content. Receiver prior belief is captured by a distribution
Q(X) over possible messages, which is updated to a posterior observation Q(X|Y ) after
observations Y are made. Suppose we allow a receiver with an incorrect uniform prior
message distribution Qinit to update its distribution to Qobs in a Bayesian manner each
time a message is received, so that the subsequent message transmission starts with the
updated prior. Since the receiver begins with a uniform prior, each message should take
roughly the same amount of time to transmit, regardless of the actual source distribution
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Figure 3.5: Strong prior beliefs slow learning. Mean transmission time is a function of
the receiver’s prior belief Q(X) over messages, rather than the source distribution P (X).
In each case, messages were transmitted from the identical source distribution, where A
was most frequent, followed by B, and so on. Each line connects response times arising
from the same prior distribution Q(X). A uniform Q(X) results in a flat line, while
a Q(X) = P (X) results in the steepest slope. In each case, the relationship between
subjective surprisal and response time is approximately linear. For each transmission,
an entropy threshold of 0.3 bits was used, with λS = 4 and λN = 10.
of messages. As the receiver observes which messages are transmitted and at what
relative frequency, Qobs will become an ever-closer approximation to P , shrinking both
DKL(P ||Qobs) and the expected transmission times.
Figure 3.5 illustrates a change in transmission times for four messages A, B, C, and
D, in which A is more frequent than B, and so on. As more messages are transmitted
and the initial uniform Q approaches the true distribution P , transmission time for
frequent messages decreases, while transmission time for infrequent messages increases.
To characterize the rate at which updates to Q influence message transmission times,
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Figure 3.6: Simulated message transmission time decreases as a function of observations,
as the prior Q approaches the source distribution P . Signals are transmitted using the
Bayes-Poisson code described in Chapter 2, with signal strength λS = 4, noise power
λN = 10, and an entropy threshold of 0.3. Points represent mean transmission times,
and the shaded region represents the 80% high-density interval of the response time
distributions. Compare with the behavioral results in Figure 3.3.
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we constructed a categorical source distribution P with k = 16 categories, but with most
of the probability mass in two categories:
P = [0.005, 0.005, 0.005, 0.005, 0.005, 0.005, 0.005, 0.005,
0.005, 0.005, 0.005, 0.005, 0.005, 0.005, 0.465, 0.465]
We initialized Qinit to have a Dirichlet prior with concentration parameters 2, rep-
resenting a weak prior belief that the source distribution is uniform. We simulated N
message transmissions, for N = 2 to N = 1024, taken evenly in log space. For each value
of N , we averaged the results across 1,000 simulated observers, resulting in an expected
posterior distribution Qobs after N observations. For each Qobs we then simulated more
2,000 message transmissions, with messages drawn with frequency defined by P , and
calculated the transmission time for each. As illustrated in Figure 3.6, the relationship
between observations N and transmission time is linear in log-log space, matching the
Power Law of Learning.
3.4 Discussion and conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a normative theory of task-specific efficient code learning.
This theory provides a generative explanation for the Power Law of Learning without
specifying a particular decision model. Our only requirement on the decision process
is that the state information for a task be transmitted through a finite-capacity chan-
nel. As such, this theory can be integrated into other decision making frameworks, in
particular neural or dual-processing theories.
Neural plausibility
The Efficient Coding Hypothesis describes a principle for optimal information trans-
mission over the lifespan of an organism interacting with their environment; adaptation
occurs on the evolutionary or developmental timescale. Recent evidence suggests that
neural codes can also adapt at the millisecond timescale, apparently in order to main-
tain a high degree of information transmission in the face of rapidly changing stimulus
44
statistics [42, 43]. These findings suggest that the Efficient Coding Hypothesis may also
apply to a fast temporal scale in addition to the relatively static tuning curves and cell
sensitivities that are the typical focus of analysis. In our view, such findings support
the plausibility of task-specific code adaptation.
Relation to automaticity
Work on automaticity and implicit learning emphasizes that attentional capacity, re-
sponse time, accuracy, and multitasking performance all increase with practice and the
development of expertise in a task [29]. However, these improvements appear to be
strongly tied to specific tasks and environments. Learning task-specific coding suggests
a normative account of these effects. When transmitting information over a limited-
capacity channel, on-line learning of an efficient code enables more information to be
transmitted in a given time. We suggest that task automaticity may be equivalent
to learning an efficient task-specific code. We call task-specific code building adaptive
because it involves adapting a neural code to a specific task.
Cognitive costs
Cognitive operations are referred to as ‘costly’ when they give rise to subjective fatigue
and behavioral aversion (see [44] for a recent review, and Chapter 5 for further discus-
sion). We note that task aversion often subsides with practice and the development of
task-specific expertise, which appears related to the development of task automaticity.
For that reason, we speculate that decrease in cognitive costs with practice may be
a direct result of learning an efficient encoding of task states, and conversely that the
costs themselves arise from transmitting information using inefficient codes. Minimizing
transmission costs may also reduce metabolic costs, which we propose to be a primary
driver of cognitive costs. See Chapter 6 for further discussion.
Limitations and future work
We have proposed that the brain learns efficient codes on-line, but have intentionally
avoided specifying neural implementation details. In order to model behavioral data
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from a specific task, we would need to specify a full decision model, an encoding al-
gorithm, and the characteristics of the information channel, e.g. channel noise. Our
current analysis serves as a normative ideal-observer model against which actual behav-
ioral data can be compared.
Chapter 4
Information integration from
multiple sources in the N-back
task
4.1 Overview
The N-back task is considered to be a prototypical working memory task, but perfor-
mance on the task correlates poorly with other tasks that measure working memory
capacity [45, 46]. Recent work suggests that subjects may exploit N-back task struc-
ture to improve performance, raising the question of whether responses solely reflect
working memory or also include the leveraging of additional information [47]. To test
this we modified the traditional N-back task to introduce sequential structure in tar-
get responses, which predicted responses either conflicting with or congruent to the
target response, similar to the Stroop task. Subjects exhibited higher accuracy and
faster responses on congruent trials than incongruent trials. To account for change in
performance, we simulate behavioral data using a model in which task statistics, past
responses, and past images combine to inform prior distributions on current stimulus
and response probabilities. We suggest that performance on the N-back task has been
largely misinterpreted, and that subjects exploit a wider array of information sources
than is normally assumed.
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4.2 Introduction
The N-back task [48, 49] is often thought of as a prototypical working memory task
and is one of the most commonly used experimental paradigms in cognitive psychology
research. In the task, subjects are shown a series of stimuli and asked to state whether
each stimulus is the same as, or different from, the stimulus observed N trials previ-
ously. The N-back task has become the ‘gold standard’ used to investigate the neural
correlates of working memory [50, 51], in part because it is thought to involve encod-
ing, maintaining, and deleting items in memory, and in part because the task design
only requires simple responses [46, 52]. In addition, the N-back task also affords the
manipulation of working memory load with N .
Despite its widespread use as a working memory task, the construct validity of the
N-back task has been called into question [45]. Performance on the N-back correlates
weakly with simple working memory span [45] and reading span [53] (though see also
[54]). It correlates not at all with the digit span backward task [55, 56]. Performance
seems to correlate more strongly with recognition tasks and more complex tasks like
the Sternberg task [53], the operation span task [54], and the Stroop task [57], though
results vary with the exact version of the task used. Performance on the N-back task
seems to correlate weakly with simple tasks in general, though some studies have used
composite scores to achieve greater correlation with N-back performance [46].
Analysis of published research reveals significant heterogeneity in stimulus design
choices and corresponding variation in both task performance itself and performance
correlation with other tasks [47, 46]. Such variation in performance across experiments
despite prima facie similarity of the task requirements suggests that subject responses
may be influenced by the structure of the task itself in addition to information about
previously observed stimuli explicitly represented in working memory. For example, a
robust source of error in the N-back task is the presence of ‘lures’, in which the stimulus
shown N − 1 or N + 1 previously matches the current stimulus, but the stimulus shown
N previously does not [45]. Errors on lure trials are consistently higher than on con-
trol trials, presumably because lures elicit a familiarity-based response, but researchers
rarely report the presence or frequency of lure trials in task descriptions [47]. Other
variation in task design includes the size of the set from which images are drawn and
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the relative frequency of ‘target’ (‘same’) responses, whether the stimulus is presented
aurally, symbolically, or spatially, and finally whether the stimuli are presented as a
long stream or a sequence of short sets.
If lure frequency, relative response frequency, or vocabulary sizes influence perfor-
mance on the N-back task, then resulting variations in performance could be understood
as involving the combining and weighting of information to generate a response that re-
flects multiple sources of input. In addition to information from stimulus familiarity and
working memory representations, a task structured to have mostly responses of ‘differ-
ent’ might lead a subject to bias responses towards ‘different’ irrespective of the value of
the currently observed stimulus. When viewed from this perspective, the N-back might
be better understood as an executive function task with a working memory component,
rather than a working memory task per se (see [47, 45] for further discussion).
Combining information to create a response also highlights an unexpected similarity
between the N-back task and cognitive control tasks. Any structure-driven response
may either be congruent to, or conflict with, a recall-based response, dividing trials into
congruent and incongruent trials [47]. This is similar in structure to the Stroop and
Flanker tasks [9, 8], in which the task is explicitly (rather than accidentally) designed
to produce compatible or conflicting response impulses. In those tasks, conflicting re-
sponses are characterized by higher error rates and longer response times than congruent
responses. A typical interpretation is that conflicting responses require cognitive control
to overcome the response encouraged by the information stream incompatible with the
task instructions [58, 59, 60].
While the effect of lures on familiarity-driven N-back responses is well-characterized,
less is known how higher-level task statistics affect N-back responses. In this chapter,
we report the results of an experiment in which we sought to explicitly test the analogy
of the N-back task as a cognitive control task, and determine whether it is possible to
influence subject behavior by manipulating the statistical structure of the task. We
designed a set of N-back stimuli with a sequential regularity in the target responses of
certain blocks. Subjects were not explicitly made aware of the structure. The sequential
regularity took the form of of the sequence SDSDSD..., where S indicates that image
shown N previously was the same as the currently visible image, and D indicates that
it is different. In such ‘patterned’ blocks, individual trials are divided into congruent
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responses, in which the response pattern predicted the same response as the N-back
instructions, and incongruent responses, in which they predicted opposite responses. In
‘random’ blocks, responses are still balanced, but the sequence is randomly ordered.
We modeled subject responses as being generated using the variable-length code
presented in Chapter 2. In this model, statistical information from task structure and
past stimuli is encoded into prior distributions utilized by signal observers to decode the
current image, and to determine actions based on the current and past images. In the
Bayesian formulation, a prior distribution is information present a priori, that is, prior
to an observation. When the prior is congruent with a current observation or response,
less information needs to be transmitted to achieve a given entropy threshold, and this
shortens response time. On the other hand, when a prior is incongruent with a given
observation or response, the information encoded in the prior must be overcome by
information observed on the current trial. This takes more time, causing response times
to lengthen. In essence, response time effects of congruent and incongruent stimuli are
predicted because (a) transmitting information takes time, and (b) information driving
an action comes from both the current stimulus and the prior, which is informed by
both past stimuli and the statistical structure of the task. The presence of a strong prior
also biases responses, creating a predictable pattern of decoding and response errors.
We compared N-back performance on congruent and incongruent trials with perfor-
mance on random blocks, in which there was no pattern in the target responses. As
expected, our task elicited a pattern of behavior compatible with traditional cognitive
control tasks: subjects responded more quickly and accurately on congruent trials than
neutral trials, and more slowly and with a higher error rate on incongruent trials. In
addition, we report response time differences for ‘same’ vs ‘different’ responses, which
are also predicted by our model.
That subject behavior is consistently influenced by the presence of statistical struc-
ture in the N-back task is strong evidence that the N-back task is not solely a working
memory task, and that it contains structural similarities to cognitive control tasks.
Moreover, model results exhibit a close qualitative match with subject responses, cor-
rectly predicting the way in which responses are manipulated in the presence of statisti-
cal structure. The model matches human behavior with respect to changes in response
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accuracy, overall response time, differential response time for ‘same’ and ’different’ re-
sponses, and differential response time for correct and incorrect responses. Patterns of
responses by both subjects and our proposed model closely match responses observed on
the Stroop and Flanker tasks. This suggests a re-interpretation of those classic tasks in
which they require information integration with informative priors, providing a quanti-
tative and principled way of understanding traditional notions of cognitive control and
pre-potent responses.
4.3 Methods
We performed a variant of the N-back task with N = 1, 2, 3. After passing a color
vision test and demonstrating an understanding of the task by reaching a performance
threshold, each subject was presented with 18 experimental blocks of 70 images each.
Data were collected from 26, 26, and 31 subjects for N = 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Following the task, subjects took a short version of the ICAR cognitive diagnostic test
[61]. Data were collected via Amazon Mechanical Turk [62]. Subjects were financially
compensated for their participation and were notified that they would be compensated
at a rate corresponding to their performance in the task, relative to performance of
other subjects. The research protocol was approved by the University of Minnesota
IRB.
4.3.1 Stimulus design
Stimulus blocks were of two types: random and patterned. In random blocks, the
sequence of target responses ‘same’ (S) and ‘different’ (D) were drawn from a categorical
distribution with equal probability, with S and D indicating that the currently presented
stimulus is the same as, or different from, the stimulus shown N trials previously. In
the patterned blocks, the sequence of responses was constructed to contain regularity :
roughly 94% of target responses followed the pattern SDSDSD..., with about 6% of
target responses deviating from that pattern. Each subject was presented with 12
patterned blocks and 6 random blocks, randomly ordered. Critically, subjects were
not told that there were two types of stimulus blocks, nor that different blocks were
structured differently. Each block appeared visually identical to the others.
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Figure 4.1: Diagram of stimulus sequencing. Following training, 18 blocks were pre-
sented composed of 70 images each. Each block was either ‘random’ or ‘patterned’.
Random and patterned blocks were randomly ordered.
To construct each stimulus block, we began with a 2-period sequence of responses
SDSDSD... for each block, such that each sequence was 70 trials long. For random
blocks, 35 trial indexes were randomly chosen, and each sampled response was switched
to the opposite response (D to S, for example), converting the sequence into a random
sequence of responses. For patterned blocks, we performed the same operation on only
6% of the target responses, leaving the repeating SDSDSD... sequence largely intact.
Once the target responses were constructed, the first N − 1 stimuli were sampled
with uniform probability from a vocabulary of 20 letters from the Romantic alphabet,
including all of the consonants except for X1. Starting with the letter at index N and
continuing to the 70th letter in the sequence, each letter was set to be the same as
the target letter if the corresponding target response was S, otherwise it was sampled
randomly from the vocabulary exclusive of the target letter.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were directed to a video detailing
task instructions. Subjects were also presented with brief textual instructions at the
beginning of each block. Subjects pressed a key to begin each block, and were permitted
to rest between blocks. Once a block began, subjects also saw a short reminder of task
instructions.
1D was unintentionally excluded from the 1-back, so the vocabulary had a cardinality of 19 in that
case
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Figure 4.2: An example stimulus screen. The current letter appeared in the center
of the screen. Instructions remained at the top of the screen for the duration of the
experiment. Correct responses were tallied on the right, and incorrect responses on
the left. Following each block, subjects saw a summary screen reporting their percent
correct for that block. Patterned and random blocks appeared visually identical.
Figure 4.3: Response sequencing in random and patterned blocks. In random blocks, S
and D responses are randomly ordered. In patterned blocks, responses typically follow
a periodic pattern. Exceptions to this pattern are called incongruent trials, because the
response is incongruent with the established sequential pattern.
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The duration of each trial was 2000ms. Each letter was presented on the screen for
500ms, followed by a 1500ms delay. Subjects responded to each stimulus by pressing
the S or D keys on the computer keyboard, and received feedback indicating whether
each response was correct or incorrect. If a subject did not respond by the time the
subsequent stimulus appeared, the response was counted as ‘incorrect’ and the trial
was marked as ‘skip’. During each block, a scoreboard was visible on screen containing
the tally of correct and incorrect responses for the current block. A screenshot of the
stimulus screen is shown in Figure 4.2.
4.3.2 Stimulus analysis
Trials in random blocks were designed such that the each response was equally likely,
with the intention that subjects must remember past images in order to generate correct
responses. We call trials in this condition ‘neutral’ in analogy with the neutral condition
in the Stroop task, as there is only one stream of information available to the subject
that is useful for generating accurate responses, aside from knowledge that each response
is equally likely.
In patterned blocks, trials are divided into congruent and incongruent trials, again
in analogy with the Stroop task. In congruent trials, the response produced by following
the N-back instructions and comparing the letter on screen with the letter presented
N trials previously are the same as the response that would be produced if the sub-
ject merely followed the repeating SDSDSD... pattern present in the majority of the
block. In incongruent trials, the response pattern is violated. In each incongruent trial,
responding according to the repeating pattern produces an incorrect response, while
responding according to the N-back instructions still produces a correct response. An
example of congruent and incongruent trials is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
‘Lures’ are past stimuli that match the image currently visible but appear at N − 1
or N + 1 positions back [47]. When the stimulus at N is different than the currently
visible stimulus, a lure trial can induce subjects to produce a response of ‘same’ at a
rate greater than chance [45]. Roughly 5% of trials in the generated stimulus were lure
trials of type N − 1 or N + 1.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Main effect
This experiment was designed to assess whether subjects exploited statistical regularities
in task stimuli and past responses to generate responses. To the extent that this is so, we
expect subject error rates and response times to differ between ‘patterned’ blocks and
‘random’ blocks. As described above, ‘patterned’ blocks can be grouped into ‘congruent’
and ‘incongruent’ trials, in which statistical regularity either reinforces or contradicts
the response predicted by the N-back instructions alone. Classic results from the Stroop
and Flanker tasks suggest that congruent trials will produce faster response times and a
lower error rate, while incongruent trials will generate slower responses and more errors,
when compared to the random condition.
Statistical tests in the text were performed as follows. For each comparison described
below, we calculated the accuracy and mean response time per subject per condition.
We then took within-subject differences of accuracy and or response time between con-
ditions, performed a bootstrap estimate of the mean of the difference, and computed
the proportion of bootstrap samples on the other side of zero from the direction of the
average difference. This method produces a bootstrap estimate of the likelihood that
the observed comparison can be attributed to chance, summarized by a p-value.
Accuracy by subject for each trial type is shown in Figure 4.4, with subject accuracy
on congruent and incongruent trials compared to accuracy on neutral trials. For the 1-
and 2-back tasks, subjects almost universally exhibit higher accuracy on congruent and
lower accuracy on incongruent trials with respect to neutral trials. The mean increase
in accuracy across subjects from the incongruent to the random condition, and from
the random condition to the congruent condition, are highly statistically significant
(p < 10−6). The trend is also present for some subjects on the 3-back task, though it is
not present for subjects achieving high accuracy on neutral trials.
Subject response times are shown in Figure 4.5. Again we see a robust effect of
trial congruence and incongruence when compared to neutral trials. In 74 out of 83
subjects (89%), incongruent trials take longer, on average, than congruent trials, and
the mean within-subject change is highly significant (p < 10−6). All but one of the
subjects who do not follow this trend were performing the 3-back task, for which we see
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Figure 4.4: Response accuracy in congruent and incongruent trials. Each subject is
represented as a line connected by two dots. Accuracy on congruent and incongruent
trials is expressed in relation to accuracy on neutral trials. The vertical black lines
represent a 0% accuracy difference from neutral trials. The gray dashed line demarcates
the achievable region, and the gray dotted line represents chance performance. Accuracy
is higher in the congruent than the incongruent condition (p < 10−6), higher in the
congruent than the random condition (p < 10−6), and higher in the random condition
than the incongruent condition (p < 10−6). Significance tests are described in the text.
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Figure 4.5: Mean response time for each subject. Each subject is represented as a line
connected by two dots. Response time on congruent and incongruent trials is expressed
in relation to response time on neutral trials. The vertical black lines represent response
time difference, and equivalent performance in each case would be evidenced by dots
lying on the black line. The gray dashed line demarcates the achievable region. Both
correct and incorrect responses are represented in the response time mean for each
subject, though no-response trials are omitted. Subject response times decreased in the
congruent condition compared to the random condition (p < 10−6) and the incongruent
condition (p < 10−6), and decreased in the incongruent condition compared to the
random condition (p < 0.001).
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Figure 4.6: Subject accuracy and response time differentials plotted by subject.
higher variation in behavior.
A combined accuracy and response time plot is given in Figure 4.6. The congruent
and incongruent conditions are linearly separable for N = 2, nearly so for N = 1, and
more variable for N = 3. For the N = 3 condition, subject behavior is more variable,
though most subjects do show either a change in response time or accuracy that is
consistent with the other values of N .
Taken together, analysis of subject response time and accuracy for congruent and
incongruent trials reveals patterns of behavior strongly consistent with behavior in the
Stroop and Flanker tasks. On the whole, congruent trials shorten response times and
increase accuracy, and vice versa for incongruent trials, with respect to neutral trials.
Results clearly suggest that the majority of subjects combine information from mul-
tiple sources rather than using any source exclusively. If subjects exclusively followed
the N-back task instructions and utilized only their declarative memory of past stimuli,
exploiting no statistical regularity in stimulus or responses, we would expect responses
on both congruent and incongruent trials to have the same time and accuracy charac-
teristics as neutral trials – as from the perspective of the subject, these trials would be
no different from neutral trials. However, a large and statistically significant difference
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is present. Moreover, if subjects exclusively utilized the regularity present in patterned
blocks, we would expect 100% accuracy on congruent trials and 0% accuracy on incon-
gruent trials. This is also clearly not the case. Taken together, this represents strong
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that subjects are combining information from mul-
tiple sources to generate responses on the N-back task. Implications for interpretations
of the task are considered in the discussion, below.
4.5 Information transmission model
In concert with the remainder of this dissertation, we seek to understand the normative
constraints on information transmission involved in performing this task. In this section,
we show that consideration of these constraints produces response characteristics that
match human behavior in both the main congruence/incongruence effect and several
auxiliary behavioral effects. We first briefly recount the information transmission model
detailed in Chapter 2, and describe its application to the modified N-back task. We
then simulate task performance using the information transmission scheme, and compare
simulated performance with human data.
In Chapter 2, we describe an information transmission scheme in which symbols are
encoded into firing rates of an array of Poisson processes (Figure 4.7). An ideal ob-
server counts the sequences of spikes produced and continuously infers the underlying
rate configuration of the Poisson processes. The observer tracks the entropy of the pos-
terior distribution over source configurations, and transmission occurs until an entropy
threshold is reached and an action is taken.
In each trial of the N-back task, subjects observe a letter and construct a response.
In the framework of the information transmission model, the stimulus on the screen
is the transmitted stimulus, encoded into an array of Poisson spikes. The receiver
decodes which letter is being transmitted. In a simple stimulus-response task, like those
used by Hick and Hyman [2, 3], each stimulus corresponds to a separate action. In
the N-back task, however, an additional step is needed to compute the appropriate
action given a decoded stimulus: as the letter is decoded, a posterior over likely actions
is also maintained and updated in real time. An action is taken when an entropy
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Figure 4.7: Schematic of the information transmission model described in Chapter 2.
(A) A symbol is encoded as a vector of Poisson process firing rates, which produce a
sequence of spikes shown in (B). (C) The decoder maintains a codebook of possible
messages and their corresponding source rates. (D) The decoder computes likelihoods
of each source configuration having produced the observed spikes, and combines the
symbol-wise likelihoods with a prior probability over symbols to produce a posterior
distribution. (E) The entropy of the posterior distribution is tracked and the symbol
is ‘decoded’ when the entropy reaches a threshold. The entropy is calculated using the
posterior distribution over symbols, which combines the likelihoods from (D) with a
prior distribution representing expected symbol frequency.
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Figure 4.8: A schematic of the combining of information in order to generate a response.
On the left side, under ‘Side info,’ information about past responses, past observed
letters, and the baseline rate of ‘same’ vs ‘different’ responses is encoded into priors
over future stimuli and actions. On the right, under ‘Stimulus’, an observed stimulus
is converted to a likelihood over letters, which is combined with prior information to
create a posterior distribution over letters (top center). This posterior is combined with
both previously observed letter to produce a likelihood of ‘same’ or ‘different’ response.
The response likelihood is combined with the prior response to create the posterior
over responses. The entropy of the response posterior is tracked until it reaches a pre-
set threshold (bottom center), at which time action is taken according to the action
corresponding to the highest probability mass. The effect of image and action prior
strengths on simulated response behavior is illustrated in Figures 4.12 and 4.13.
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Figure 4.9: Statistical information is used to construct informative priors for stimuli
and responses. Various prior distributions generate very different simulated behavior,
as illustrated in Figures 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14.
threshold is reached for the distribution over actions. A schematic of the stimulus-to-
action information flow is given in Figure 4.8.
The variable-length transmission model of the N-back task provides an explicit place
for information about previously observed letters, the relative frequency of responses,
and statistical patterns in target responses to influence responses: decoding priors. A
prior distribution over responses is provided by the statistical structure of responses. On
random blocks, S and D have equal frequency and result in a uniform distribution over
responses, while in patterned blocks the response prior is (or at least, can be) heavily
biased towards the response opposite to the previous response. Knowledge of previous
stimuli can also influence priors over stimuli. Knowing that the letter A was observed
previously, and that half of trials have a response of ‘same’, an ideal observer would
place p = 0.5 on the next letter being A, while the remaining probability mass would
be distributed over the remaining letters.
The key insight provided by the variable-length transmission model of the N-back
task, and the one that explains the observed behavioral phenomena, is that response
time is directly related to the quantity of information transmitted from the stimulus,
through the nerves and brain, and to the fingers – and this quantity is influenced by sub-
ject prior distributions over both stimuli and responses. Recall that from the perspective
of the decoder, information transmitted is equivalent to the KL-divergence between a
prior distribution (over stimuli and over responses) and a posterior distribution over
the same quantities [20] at response time (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). As
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Figure 4.10: The relationship between the prior distribution and the posterior distribu-
tion required for a response determines response time. Incongruent priors have larger
KL-divergence with the posterior at the entropy threshold than congruent priors, leading
to larger response times.
side information impacts the prior distribution over both the stimulus observed and the
likely response, it also influences the amount of novel information that must be inte-
grated on each trial before an entropy threshold is reached and a response is generated,
and thus influences the response time. In most cases, prior information aids subject
responses by capturing information that would otherwise need to be decoded from the
environment. ‘Congruent’ trials are an extreme case of this. In other cases, prior in-
formation contradicts information from the environment, creating ‘incongruent’ trials.
Since information transmission time is related to response time (see Chapters 2 and 3),
such prior congruence and incongruence with stimuli and responses directly influences
response times in a predictable way. The strength of the priors shown in Figure 4.8
affects the relative response times for congruent and incongruent conditions, ‘same’ vs
‘different’ targets, and correct responses vs errors.
4.6 Simulation results
Using the information flow pattern outlined in Figure 4.8, we simulated responses to
stimuli under congruent, neutral, and incongruent conditions under a range of entropy
thresholds, signal powers, and noise powers. Unless otherwise noted in the figure cap-
tion, simulation results represent a range of parameters whose response time and ac-
curacy results are roughly compatible with behavioral observations. Simulation results
are plotted in Figure 4.15 in a format consistent with the experimental results shown in
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Figure 4.11: Distributions of subject response times by values of N and condition. Data
from all subjects is pooled. Incorrect responses tend to be faster than correct responses,
particularly for the incongruent condition. Compare to Figures 4.12 and 4.13.
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Figure 4.12: Simulated response times with both an informative prior over letters (see
Figures 4.8) or a uniform prior over letters, as pictured in Figure 4.9. Signal power
and noise power were both 15 spikes/second, with an entropy threshold set to 0.5 bits.
Placing a uniform prior over letter stimuli results in very fast responses, and almost all
responses for a target of ‘same’ are incorrect. Compare with human data in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.13: Simulated response time distributions for various weightings of previous
responses, corresponding to the p = reli. in the response prior in Figure 4.8. Simulations
were performed with a signal and noise power of 15 spikes/second, with an entropy
threshold of 0.5 bits. Comparing with human results in the Congruent and Incongruent
conditions in Figure 4.11, a prior weight of about 0.7 matches human data.
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Figure 4.14: Accuracy of simulated trials is strongly affected by the strength of the
response prior. In each case, simulations were performed with an entropy threshold of
0.5 bits, and both signal power and noise power of 15 spikes/second. Prior information
creates characteristic errors for the incongruent condition, and increases accuracy for
the congruent condition.
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Figure 4.15: Simulated message transmissions under congruent, neutral, and incon-
gruent conditions for a range of signal powers, noise powers, and entropy thresholds.
Congruence reflects the relationship between the response prior (‘same’ or ‘different’)
and the target response. All congruent and incongruent transmissions were performed
with a ‘reliability’ value of 0.7, which represents a medium-strength prior over responses,
while neutral transmissions reflect a ‘reliability’ value of 0.5. Each point is a summary
of 500 simulated transmissions. Compare with human responses in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and
4.6.
Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. Similar to human subjects, simulations show faster response
times and lower error rates with congruent trials when compared to neutral trials, and
the pattern is reversed for incongruent trials.
Interestingly, simulations reveal that accuracy can be manipulated in a predictable
way by manipulating the prior on responses. Generally speaking, a fixed stopping
threshold on entropy translates to a fixed value for response accuracy: a lower entropy
threshold results in high accuracy, and vice versa. However, a prior belief in a given
response appears to induce a corresponding bias in responses, increasing accuracy when
the prior and correct response are congruent, and decreasing accuracy when they are
incongruent. This can be seen in Figure 4.15: each horizontal line represents a single
fixed set of simulation parameters, including a fixed entropy stopping threshold. Despite
this, varying the prior distribution over stimuli and responses produces variation in
error rates. This effect can be explained by the fundamental difference between decoder
entropy over the action posterior distribution, a fundamentally subjective quantity, and
accuracy, which is objective. That subjects exhibit the same pattern of responses in
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 provides further evidence for the suggestion that responses are
68
influenced by priors over responses.
Responses of ‘same’ vs ‘different’
In addition to the effects of stimulus congruence and incongruence on response time
and accuracy, subjects typically respond more quickly when the presented stimulus
is the same as the stimulus presented N previously than they do when it is different
(p < 0.001). Average response times by subject are shown in Figure 4.16. This difference
in response time by target response is also replicated by our model, as illustrated in the
figure. The shape of the prior distribution over letters, with a larger weight placed on
the ‘same’ response shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9, is critical to replicating this effect in
our model. Placing a uniform prior on images results in much faster simulated response
times for ‘different’ than ‘same’ responses. This does not match human behavioral data.
Response time distributions
The full distribution of pooled subject response times separated by congruence condition
is given in Figure 4.17. As shown in the summary figures above, subjects tend to
respond more slowly with higher N . The effect of congruence or incongruence is also
evident, with congruent responses faster than neutral responses (p < 10−6), and neutral
responses faster than incongruent responses (p < 0.005), on average. Viewing the full
response time distribution shows that the effect is relatively small when compared to
the variation in response times.
Response times for simulated transmissions are illustrated in the bottom two panels
of Figure 4.17. Simulated response times are distributed in a way qualitatively similar
to human responses, though they begin near 0ms rather than 200ms. Distributions are
shown for two values of transmission noise power, with only the lowest simulated value
for signal power. The shape of the plots suggest that human responses are most similar
to simulations with a relatively low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
Separating responses by correctness (see Figure 4.18) reveals that the relationship
between response times on congruent, neutral, and incongruent trials is reversed when
errors are committed. In this case, subjects respond most quickly to incongruent trials,
followed by neutral, followed by congruent (all significant at p < 10−4). The ordering
holds for each level of N , and is also exhibited by the model. This pattern occurs
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Figure 4.16: Comparison of average response times on ‘same’ and ‘different’ trials for
each subject, and for simulated transmissions. The average difference in response time
for ‘different’ vs ‘same’ is plotted relative to 0, where an identical value would result in
a point on the vertical line. Subjects and simulations largely exhibit slower responses
when the target response is ‘different’ vs when it is ‘same’ (p < 0.001). Simulations
suggest that this effect is largely due to the shape of the prior distribution over stimuli,
as discussed in the text.
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Figure 4.17: Distribution of pooled response times across subjects for each value of N,
and for two simulations. The distribution of subject data more closely resembles the
high-noise simulation. For each condition, responses on congruent trials are faster than
responses on neutral trials (p < 10−6), which are faster than responses on incongruent
trials (p < 0.001).
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Figure 4.18: Response times pooled across subjects and faceted into ‘correct’ and ‘in-
correct’ responses. While correct responses show the expected ordering of incongruent,
neutral, and congruent response times, the pattern is reversed for incorrect responses,
and the differences are statistically significant (p < 10−4). This reversal is also present
in simulation results.
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because the condition labels congruent and incongruent indicate that the response is
biased towards a particular response, where the bias is encoded in the strength of the
prior over responses. The KL-divergence between the prior and the ‘biased-towards’
response is therefore relatively small, and might be overcome by channel noise.
4.7 Discussion and implications
We found that subject response time and accuracy on the N-back task is influenced in
a predictable and consistent way by the statistical structure of task responses. This
finding supports skepticism over whether the N-back task exhibits construct validity as
a purely working memory task [47, 45], as subject behavior appears to combine and
weight information from multiple sources that include response statistics in addition to
properties of the stimulus. The N-back task continues to serve as an interesting and
useful experimental paradigm, but our findings add to the growing chorus of sugges-
tions that the stimulus should be carefully constructed and its statistics checked for
unintended regularity and structure.
We showed that the influence of experimental manipulations on subject behavior
was well-modeled by a continuous information transmission model in which stimulus
regularities are represented by the shape of the prior used by the receiver to decode the
transmission of stimulus content and convert it into action. The close match between
model and subject behavior lends weight to the idea that perception is Bayesian [63],
exploiting prior information to speed recognition and increase its accuracy. That prior
information is critical to modeling subject responses is consistent with recent work
demonstrating Bayesian information integration into motor responses in more complex
movement tasks [64].
We demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3 that the Bayes-Poisson signal transmission
model accounts for several classic findings in behavioral psychology, including the Power
Law of Learning [18] and the Hick-Hyman law [2, 17]. While this parsimony is desir-
able in-and-of itself, the scientific value of a model lies in its ability to make testable
predictions and explain novel findings. In this chapter, we have shown that the model
predicts and accounts for the effects of the statistical structure of both task stimuli and
responses on both subject response time and accuracy in a principled and interpretable
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way. The model also correctly predicts the response time differential between ‘same’
and ‘different’ responses, and the way in which the response time patterns vary with
error responses vs correct responses. We suggest that this represents a major validation
of the modeling strategy as an algorithm-level model of cognitive processes involved in
responding to stimuli.
4.7.1 Limitations
There are several opportunities to extend the work presented here. Perhaps most im-
portantly, we do not yet possess a closed-form relationship between model parameters
(like signal power, stimulus cardinality, and entropy threshold) and subject behavior in
the form of expected response time and error rates, as mentioned in Chapter 2. With a
closed-form relationship between parameters and data, we would be able to infer indi-
vidual subject parameters, study individual differences, and perform principled model
comparison with alternative explanations.
In addition, there are several improvements in the experimental design that should
be implemented in future work. In the current design, each subject only completed the
experiment for a single value of N . Collecting data on several values of N for each
subject would allow a comparison of inferred model parameters with subjective effort.
Recent work has shown that subjects find the N-back task increasingly aversive as N
grows [65]. It would be valuable to investigate associations between subjective change
in effort expended and model parameters such as signal power or noise power. For
example, does effort map to increased signal power, or to inference in the presence of
greater noise?
Collection of data on Amazon Mechanical Turk also presented several unexpected
challenges. Subject attrition was high (around 50%). It is possible that voluntary
attrition may have biased results to exclude subjects for whom the N-back task was
unpleasant or particularly difficult, or some other unmeasured confound. This possibility
has only minimal impact on the current analysis, as all analyses were either within-
subject or within-condition, but it would be a problem were we to attempt to perform
analyses across values of N .
Finally, the period-2 response pattern in the ‘patterned’ condition induced a statis-
tical regularity of the stimuli in the 2-back task that was not present in the 1- or 3-back
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Figure 4.19: Average response times by congruence condition on the 3-back task, sepa-
rated by whether subjects achieved high accuracy (defined as accuracy > 75%) or low
accuracy. As shown in Figure 4.4, high accuracy subjects on the 3-back task showed very
little sensitivity to congruence condition in terms of accuracy. The effect of congruence
condition on response times is relatively robust.
tasks, and may explain why the effect of congruence and incongruence was stronger
than for the 2-back task than the 1- and 3-back. The existence of this regularity can be
subsumed by the prior over letters, so it does not invalidate our analyses or conclusions.
Nevertheless, it represents an undesirable source of statistical variation across N-back
conditions.
4.7.2 The 3-back puzzle
Some subjects performing the 3-back task exhibited qualitatively different behavior
than subjects performing the 1- and 2-back tasks. In particular, Figure 4.4 shows that
subjects with high accuracy on the 3-back task show very little sensitivity to statistics
in the responses, that is, of congruence or incongruence in trials. We consider two
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possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, it is possible that some subjects
performing the 3-back task are extremely high achievers and value accuracy highly.
Many (but not all) of these subjects exhibit the expected change in response time as a
function of congruence condition, as illustrated in Figure 4.19. We divided subjects into
’high accuracy’ and ’low accuracy’ groups, where high accuracy groups achieved > 75%
accuracy on the random condition, and plotted their response times. The high accuracy
group showed slower response times (145ms slower on average), indicating that they
may have prioritized accuracy over speed in the task overall, and also with respect to
the influence of the congruence condition. An argument against this hypothesis is that
subjects who maintained high accuracy (and thus a low entropy threshold) on the 1- and
2-back tasks nevertheless exhibited a relatively high sensitivity to congruence conditions
in terms of response accuracy, as did the simulation results with a pre-specified low
entropy threshold.
An alternative explanation is that subjects who perform with high accuracy on
the 3-back task are unaware of the presence of a pattern in the target responses, or
are unwilling to invest cognitive resources in tracking an unreliable auxiliary source of
information. The patterned response leads to correct responses for the vast majority of
trials in patterned blocks, but not every trial. Perhaps risk-averse subjects, or subjects
who highly prioritized accuracy, were not willing to incorporate an unreliable signal.
One of these proposals might explain why approximately 10 out of the 20 high-accuracy
3-back subjects showed no statistically significant effect of condition on response time,
whereas only 2 of 11 low-accuracy showed no effect.
Considering the model itself, suppose the statistical information about the task is
maintained not as an abstract prior distribution, but instead as a recurrent spiking
network that utilizes resources in the maintenance of the representation. In a limited-
resource environment, an agent would need to allocate resources (perhaps an overall
spike rate) to maintaining prior information or transmitting information about the
stimulus. In a high-demand task, this could manifest as a sub-optimal combining of
information: either the subject relies heavily on the prior, in which case we would see
an extreme effect of the congruence condition, or relies heavily on updating the likeli-
hood and ignores the prior, leading to a diminished effect of the congruence condition.
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This uni-dimensional allocation decision – maintaining the prior or updating the likeli-
hood – might explain the grouping we see in the 3-back task, and the higher demands
of the 3-back task might explain why it is only apparent there. More research is needed
to investigate the relative merit of these possible explanations.
4.7.3 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that subject behavior on the N-back task is responsive to the sta-
tistical structure of both stimuli and responses in addition to past and currently viewed
images as typically assumed by task instructions. We introduced a principled manner
for combining information and showed that simulations matched human behavior in a
range of characteristics, validating the information transmission model introduced in
Chapter 2.
We also uncovered structural similarities between the N-back task and other cog-
nitive control tasks. If stimulus congruence and incongruence with prior expectations
can be so cleanly modeled in the N-back task, it raises the question of whether classic
tasks like the Stroop, Flanker, and Stop-Signal tasks can be similarly modeled. If so, it
would establish that our quantitative model of inference and information transmission
is a parsimonious and valuable model for a range of tasks that currently have primar-
ily qualitative explanations. It may be that classic concepts of priming, pre-potent
responses and recency effects can likewise be formalized in inferential and information-
theoretic terms.
‘
Chapter 5
Why do some tasks feel more
effortful than others?
5.1 Overview
Some tasks give rise to a subjective feeling of mental effort, while others do not. Exist-
ing literature on cognitive control addresses the decision of whether to engage in such
tasks as a function of motivational incentives, by weighing mental costs vs intrinsic and
extrinsic benefits. It is less clear why some tasks are more demanding than others in
the first place, or why effort often decreases with practice. We propose that effort is a
function of the energetic cost of encoding and transmitting task variables, and that this
cost is itself a function of task exposure. Grounded in information-theoretic formalism,
this model provides a normative explanation for mental effort, predicts a general lack of
transfer learning, clearly distinguishes cognitive control from self-control, and provides
a quantitative way to formalize task interference and pre-potent responses.
5.2 Introduction
We are all familiar with the feeling of mental effort and accumulating fatigue. We
must concentrate to drive in heavy traffic or play a game of Go. It takes particular
effort to learn a new skill or converse in a new language. The effort expended is not
without consequence: we finish the game of Go exhausted, or slip back into our native
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tongue when given the slightest encouragement. We may even decide that learning a
new language is not worth the effort. What is it about the demands of these tasks that
gives rise to the experience of effort? And why does that effort seem to decrease with
practice?
As it relates to decision making and practice effects, mental effort has been thor-
oughly studied, though often by disparate communities of researchers. Behavioral
economists have described our tendency to avoid mental effort via the use of ‘fast-and-
frugal’ heuristics [66], and speak of a ‘law of least mental effort’ [67] leading humans to
act as ‘cognitive misers’ [68]. Others have shown that the use of mental effort appears
to be an active decision that is sensitive to extrinsic rewards, and that the reward re-
quired for a given level of effort expenditure varies across individuals [65] and with task
demands [58, 65]. That mental effort requires incentivization is no surprise, as it also
induces negative emotion [69, 70, 71], avoidance behavior [72, 65, 73], and a tendency
to quit [74] or become fatigued [75, 76, 77]. Luckily, mental effort from task engage-
ment can be reduced via practice: investigators of task ‘automaticity’ have observed
that extensive practice with a task tends to decrease the effort required to perform
the task [78, 26], possibly because the requisite computations begin as ‘model-based’
mental-simulation and settle into ‘model-free’ policy execution [79]. Furthermore, the
rate of response time decrease with practice is consistent enough to warrant calling the
trend a “Power Law of Practice” [80, 18].
The circumstances in which mental effort arises fall into four categories: tasks re-
quiring a high level of attention or memory, novel tasks, tasks that introduce a conflict
between a ‘pre-potent’ response and a ‘correct’ response, and frequent switching be-
tween tasks. It is not yet clear what these task types have in common that explains
their giving rise to a common subjective experience of effort. More troubling, there is
as yet no normative explanation for whether, and why, a given task will require mental
effort, or the rate at which effort will decrease with practice. Attempts to describe effort
reduction as a consequence of developing a ‘model-free’ state-action mapping [79] do not
account for the fact that in many effort-inducing tasks, a policy is already provided to
subjects in the form of explicit instructions. Literature on task automaticity character-
izes the reduction of effort with practice, but efforts to provide normative predictions
(rather than simply descriptions) of this effect are limited to memory retrieval and not
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task performance per se [28, 81, 30]. Finally, despite the constraints inherent to any
operation of a biological system, the nature and existence of a relationship between
mental effort and biological constraints remains a matter of debate.
Our goal in this chapter is to argue that mental effort tracks the energetic costs of
representing and transmitting task-related variables. Using the Bayes-Poisson model
introduced in Chapter 2, we propose that in the cases of attention and working memory
load, novel tasks, and conflicting tasks, mental effort tracks the number of spikes re-
quired to transmit task-related information. In novel tasks, we show that an inefficient
and un-adapted code requires more Poisson spikes to transmit the same stimulus vari-
ables than an efficient code. We model conflict tasks, such as the Stroop task, with a
leaky attentional filter, in which transmission noise slows response times and increases
the number of spikes required to perform each trial of the task. Each case gives rise to
mental effort, and each case uses energy (modeled as spikes) at a high rate. Viewing task
costs through the lens of information transmission costs provides a unifying perspective
that brings cohesion to the seemingly unrelated tasks associated with mental effort.
5.2.1 Background
What task conditions give rise to the experience of mental effort? Mental
effort produced by tasks is typically ascribed to the intensive utilization of a constrained
cognitive process. Sustained attention leads to mental effort and eventual fatigue, which
is induced by so-called ‘vigilance’ or ‘selective attention’ tasks that require constant
monitoring of a stimulus for an infrequent signal [82]. Tasks requiring use of famously-
limited working memory resources, such as the N-back task, are also reliable and widely-
cited drivers of mental effort. With working memory tasks, the experience of effort
increases with memory load [65]. There is also a well-documented tendency to minimize
load by leaving task-relevant information ‘in the environment’ when possible [83, 84, 85],
and only refer to it as moment-by-moment task demands dictate. This suggests a
pressure to minimize cognitive load within tasks, a tendency that has been associated
with the use of heuristics [66] and cognitive biases [40].
Critically, it is not just attention or memory load that gives rise to a sense of effort.
Another category of effort-inducing tasks introduces a conflict between two or more
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response mechanisms. The famous Stroop task [9, 86] requires subjects to read a col-
ored word and respond with the color of the word rather than its text - a difficult and
fatiguing request to fulfill [87], that leads to frustration [88], negative affect [69], and a
desire to quit [74]. Other conflict-inducing tasks include the Stop-Signal Task, in which
subjects are instructed to respond in contradictory ways in rapid succession [89], and the
Flanker task, in which a symbol is shown adjacent to other symbols that indicate incom-
patible responses [8]. A common interpretation of human performance in these tasks is
that individuals have a ‘pre-potent response’ available for each stimulus that must be
‘overridden’ [90]. Responding in a manner incompatible with the pre-potent response
is said to require ‘cognitive control’ [91] and use of ‘executive function’ [92], concepts
which overlap heavily with attention and working memory utilization. While response
incompatibilities within a task produce a feeling of effort, so do incompatibilities in
temporally adjacent tasks. Experimental paradigms involving frequent task-switching,
like the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task [93] or the number-color manipulation introduced
in [73], lead to fatigue and behavioral aversion. As above, performance on each of these
tasks has been shown to be sensitive to incentives [73, 94].
Measurable hallmarks of mental effort Mental effort often evokes a feeling of
subjective displeasure, negative emotion, or a desire to quit. Measuring this negative
affect can be accomplished in multiple ways. The most direct method is to elicit direct
subject reports of feelings such as frustration, anxiety, unpleasantness, or the desire to
avoid the task in the future [71, 70]. The potential for bias implicit in the elicitation
of self-report [95] has led researchers to rely instead on implicit measures of subjective
experience, such as the affective priming paradigm [96, 97]. In this paradigm, priming
subjects with stimuli inducing positive or negative emotions reliably affects response
time latency when responding to affect-categorized probe words.
In addition to a self-report of displeasure, people can exhibit a dislike of cognitively
demanding tasks by simply avoiding them. “Demand-selection tasks” are a widely-used
experimental paradigm designed to measure subject avoidance of cognitively demanding
tasks [98]. A typical experimental design is to create several versions of a task with a
hidden or explicit difficulty parameter (such as the ‘N’ in the N-back task, or a task
switching rate). Subjects are free to choose from among the task options. In some
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experiments, no financial incentive is tied to task engagement and subjects’ engagement
choices are taken to reveal a bias against the less frequently chosen tasks or task param-
eters [73]. In others, subjects are offered the option of choosing between task options,
in which each is assigned an explicit monetary reward. By varying reward magnitudes
and observing subject choices, relative preferences among task difficulties can be mea-
sured quantitatively [94, 65]. Using incentives to induce subjects to engage in mentally
effortful activities is particularly appealing, as it affords the application of frameworks
from behavioral economics, including quantification of effort in terms of a currency, and
explicitly framing mental effort as a cost to be weighed against the benefits of a reward.
Preferences for effort avoidance can also be revealed by subject behavior within a given
task. For example, Droll found that rather than using working memory to capacity
in a demanding task, eye movements indicated that subjects only sampled stimulus
information as-needed [85].
Sustained mental effort also leads to cognitive fatigue, characterized by a feeling of
increased effort [99], increased reaction times, decreased accuracy [75], weariness and
boredom (see [100, 101], cited in [12]). One way to measure the degree of fatigue induced
by a particular task is by using the so-called ‘dual-task paradigm’, in which subjects
are asked to perform two different tasks in sequence. The cognitive difficulty of the first
task is varied across subjects, and relative performance on the second task is compared
across conditions (see [99] for a review). A performance decrease in the second task is
taken to indicate a ‘depleting’ effect from the first task, though exactly what is depleted
is a matter of much debate, and the size of the effect is often small [102].
Finally, engagement with mentally effortful tasks produces measurable biophysical
changes often associated with stress, including increased heart rate, increased blood
pressure, and change in skin conductance [103]. Unlike behavioral measures, these
changes are often autonomic and readily replicable. However, care must be taken not
to conflate the cause of such changes with other potential sources of stress, such as time
constraints or the commission of errors.
What are the popular theories explaining mental effort? There is general
agreement that the aversive phenomenological experience of mental effort serves to
negatively influence an individual’s decision to engage or persevere in a task. The
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feeling of mental effort is a demotivator, a behavioral feedback mechanism provided by
evolution. This phenomenon parallels physical effort, which has the same subjective
structure and impact on demotivating behavior. While physical effort corresponds to
muscle utilization and is empirically observable via increased oxygen uptake, increased
heart rate, and an increasing concentration of metabolic byproducts in cells [104, 105],
mental effort is typically assumed to be a quasi-phenomenon that reflects a sort of
calculus in which cognitive load is traded for extrinsic or intrinsic benefits [60]. As such,
mental effort is treated as an abstract cost in a cost-benefit analysis, though there is
some disagreement about the nature of the cost.
This disagreement results from various attempts to map effort-related costs to key
variables in decision making frameworks, typically borrowed from economics or control
theory. For example, Kool and Botvinick suggest that mental effort is a temporal labor
cost to be weighed against cognitive leisure [10]. In a similar spirit, Kurzban et al. have
proposed that mental effort from task engagement reflects an opportunity cost from not
engaging in other tasks [12]. Other models suggest that rewards expected from engaging
in cognitive control are judiciously weighed against the intrinsic costs of the required
effort [11]. Perhaps mental effort simply discourages use of limited-capacity shared
resources like working memory and information transfer ([106] echoes earlier ideas of
a ‘multiple resources’ [107, 108] with limited capacity [109]). Because these costs are
associated with generic variables in decision models in each case, these accounts do not
provide a normative explanation for why some tasks, and not others, evoke effort.
How do metabolic factors relate to mental effort? Despite the analogy with
physical effort, there is little evidence that mental effort is related to the use or lim-
ited availability of metabolic resources, and suggestions to that end have been met
with skepticism [110]. If mental effort indeed reflects metabolic resource utilization, we
would expect a two-way causal connection between mental effort and resource availabil-
ity: effort should deplete the resource, and a depleted resource should make engaging in
effortful tasks more difficult. Regarding the first of these, there is little direct evidence
to suggest that blood glucose, the most obvious metabolic resource, is meaningfully de-
pleted following mental effort. While there is some evidence that sustained mental effort
results in a measurable decrease in blood glucose levels [111], the decrease (typically <
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1 mmol/L) is not nearly enough to account for the level of fatigue typically experienced
following decreases of over 10 mmol/L [112].
The most thorough investigations of the relationship between cognitive function
and resource depletion involve the study of the so-called ‘ego-depletion’ effect, in which
subjects in a dual-task paradigm perform worse on the second task if the first task is
particularly demanding [113], implying that the first task has ‘used up’ some underlying
resource, presumably energy. Upon extensive replication this effect was found to be
small or nonexistent [102]. Several studies claimed that imbibing a glucose drink after
the first task improved performance on the second task [114], but again the causal
mechanism has more recently been called into question [115].
In the other direction of the causal chain, evidence of a clear relationship between
resource availability and performance of mentally effortful tasks is abundant. Lowering
of blood glucose via an insulin drip or fasting has been shown to impair working memory
[116], declarative memory [117], attention [118], the speed of decision-making [119], and
performance on the Stroop task [120] and Go/No-Go task [121]. Working memory
is particularly sensitive to glucose levels, with observable impairments occurring even
with moderately low glucose levels still within the normal range [116, 122]. Moreover,
memory performance can be improved with moderately higher blood glucose levels of
160 mg/dL in both animals [123] and humans [124]. Motor tasks such as the finger
tapping task, on the other hand, are not sensitive to moderate manipulations in blood
glucose [121, 125, 126]. In general, it appears that mentally effortful tasks are more
sensitive to blood glucose levels than non-effortful tasks. For a thorough review see
[112]. While these findings do not constitute evidence that the mentally effortful tasks
use more energy than other tasks, they do suggest a strong dependency between the
availability of metabolic resources and successful engagement in effortful tasks.
5.3 What’s missing
The core challenge in modeling mental effort is providing an integrative account of
the various scenarios in which the hallmarks of effort arise. A similar collection of
effort-related phenomena (fatigue, avoidance, sensitivity to incentivization, and negative
affect) are observed from engagement in seemingly unrelated types of tasks, strongly
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suggesting a single underlying mechanism of effort. While variables like control [11]
and throughput co-vary with effort for some categories of tasks, these explanations are
hard to apply to the effort experienced from engagement in novel tasks. Furthermore,
introducing intermediate ‘cost’ variables not grounded in biological constraints begs the
question: why are control and throughput costly?
We believe that these gaps can be filled in a simple and unified manner by adopting
the hypothesis that mental effort reflects the energetic costs of task-related information
representation and transmission in the brain. In what follows, we identify three problems
in the contemporary literature on mental effort, and suggest that identifying mental
effort as a proxy for energetic information representation costs provides a unified and
parsimonious solution to each. In the remainder of the paper, we provide theoretical
and simulation-supported evidence for the claims made in this section.
Gap 1: allocation across tasks rather than within tasks
The influential models of mental effort mentioned in Section 5.2.1 ask how the brain
allocates cognitive resources over time, and provide candidate algorithms for doing so
in a way that maximizes reward and minimizes effort via task selection. However, there
is abundant evidence that we minimize mental effort within tasks as well, sometimes
using “fast and frugal” heuristics [66] to follow a “law of least mental effort” [67] rather
than engaging in “intrinsically costly” effortful cognitive processes [10]. We feel that a
full account of mental effort should be able to explain how effort is minimized within a
task, and indeed what “resource” is minimized along with mental effort.
Solution 1: mental effort tracks information transmission and representation
costs
In the spirit of David Marr’s computational level of analysis [7], the phenomena of mental
effort minimization while performing tasks may be viewed as a solution to a particular
problem the brain is trying to solve: maximizing reward over time while minimizing
resource utilization. When viewed across tasks, solutions to this involve comparing task
demands and benefits, and result in selective engagement with tasks. This is the scenario
addressed by most models of mental effort, described above. Even within a given task,
however, there is the opportunity for optimizing the efficiency of encoding, representing,
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and transmitting the task-related information required to perform the task successfully.
The suggestion that the brain develops mechanisms for efficiently encoding information
about the natural environment is an old and well-tested idea called the Efficient Coding
Hypothesis [33]. Though the evidence for the Efficient Coding Hypothesis has primarily
been sought at the level of sensory systems, the possibility of its application at the level of
cognition and task learning offers a fruitful and normative approach for the investigation
of mental effort and learning. In cases where errors are not costly, subjects may prefer
to maintain low-fidelity representations of task variables, an option easily incorporated
into a signal-transmission model of mental effort, which may also manifest as cognitive
biases.
Taking the perspective that mental effort tracks information transmission and rep-
resentation costs allows us to predict that as the brain learns to efficiently encode task-
related information, costs of information transmission should decrease, and the feeling
of mental effort should decrease. The tools of information theory describe bounds on
signal efficiency as a function of task statistics ‘in the world’ and their relationship to
the statistics maintained by the encoder and decoder. As stated above, this allows us
to predict both mental effort decrease and response time decrease as a function of task
practice.
Gap 2: unified explanation of phenomena
Mental effort is produced by utilization of the seemingly distinct mechanisms of working
memory and attention use, ‘conflict’ override and control, engagement in novel tasks,
and task-switching. Each of these conditions has been shown to produce the subjective
feelings associated with mental effort, namely fatigue, responsiveness to incentives, a
desire to quit, and negative affect. As this cluster of phenomena appear in tandem
with each other, they may share a common underlying cause despite the apparently
distinct scenarios in which they arise. This has been acknowledged to some degree in
the literature on ‘cognitive control’; however, ‘control’ is typically used as a synonym for
‘allocation of effort’ [59, 11], providing no explanatory power as to why these processes
(and not others like simple object recognition, habitual responses, or simple motor
movements) are effortful or require cognitive control.
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Solution 2: mental effort tracks information transmission and representation
costs
As we show below, transmission costs can be represented as a function of both through-
put and encoding efficiency. We would therefore expect high costs in cases where
throughput is high (demands on working memory and attention) or efficiency is low
(novel tasks, conflicting tasks). We suggest that task switching falls into this latter
camp, and results in effort when an encoding for one task is used to perform another
task. Information transmission costs thus provide a unifying explanation that predicts
the scenarios in which we expect mental effort to arise, incorporating throughput, learn-
ing, conflict, and task switching.
Gap 3: characterizing rather than explaining mental effort
A full account of mental effort should include a normative explanation for the conditions
in which it arises. Contemporary accounts of mental effort [91, 11, 127, 106, 128] provide
characterizations of the allocation of mental effort and cognitive control. Mental effort
and cognitive control are treated as ‘intrinsically’ or ‘inherently’ costly, but it is not clear
why some processes, and not others, should incur a cost. Authors certainly acknowledge
that the level of mental effort experienced has some relation to task demands. For
example, it is commonly accepted that the effort induced by the N -back task scales
with N [65], and that task switching costs are a function of switching frequency [73].
But no useful explanation is provided as to why more frequent switching or a higher
N produces a greater degree of mental effort. When explanations are given in other
literature, effort is explained to be the result of “resource utilization”, “cognitive load”,
or “task set loading” costs, but no account is provided sufficient to produce predictions
of mental effort magnitude [91]. The case is similar with cognitive control tasks like the
Stroop task. It is assumed (and is borne out by evidence) that such tasks are subjectively
costly. Explanations of the source of cost involve the “override of pre-potent responses”,
but again there is no normative explanation for why such override should be effortful.
The suggestion that mental effort reflects opportunity costs [12] represents a signif-
icant exception to this pattern. In this view, effort reflects a relative value judgment: a
task feels effortful if cognitive capacity can be better utilized elsewhere. Effort is a signal
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indicating the sub-optimal allocation of cognitive resources. This model explains the
conditions under which effort arises, and attempts to account for the existence of mental
effort in addition to the algorithm of its allocation. Despite this, the model of effort
as opportunity costs fails to explain, in a normative way, which tasks should produce
the strongest sensations of effort, or the manner in which task parameters influence the
feeling of effort.
Solution 3: mental effort tracks information transmission and representation
costs
In order to perform a task, a subject chooses actions in response to stimuli. Assume that
the subject has been instructed in the task paradigm and the ‘correct’ action in each
scenario is known, as is the case in nearly every task designed to induce mental effort.
We can consider the stimulus to be a message transmitted from the sense organs through
the brain to an action-selection mechanism. As described in Chapter 2, the quantity of
information transmitted to the neural action-selection mechanism is defined by a signal
receiver’s uncertainty about which stimulus might be present, which in turn is a function
of the probability distribution of task stimuli. In this way, the magnitude of information
transmission, and thus transmission costs, can be described (in part) as a function of
task properties. To the extent that mental effort tracks information transmission costs,
this affords a normative account of which tasks should be experienced as costly: tasks
with higher receiver/decoder uncertainty (e.g. high working memory load), or with a
higher required response rate (e.g. vigilance tasks), or with an inefficient code (e.g.
novel tasks).
As we describe below, transmission costs must incorporate the task properties as
assumed by the receiver, a fact that may explain reduction of mental effort with task
practice. Where experience with the task affords subjects a better model of task statis-
tics, transmission costs, and therefore effort, should decrease.
Our approach agrees with existing accounts in that we acknowledge the demotivating
role played by the phenomenological experience of mental effort, and we do not deny
that the decision to engage in effortful tasks is a function of incentives. In quantifying
the cause of mental effort in terms of task demands and subject learning, we contribute
a normative explanation of the source of effort.
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5.3.1 Summary & approach
The goal of this chapter is to argue for the plausibility and parsimony of an information-
theoretic interpretation of mental effort as a function of the energetic costs of information
representation and transmission. To instantiate this investigation, we use the Bayes-
Poisson model introduced in Chapter 2. The model consists of an array of Poisson
processes used to encode and transmit information, and a Bayesian observer and de-
coder to receive information. We utilize this model for two reasons. First, we wish to
demonstrate how the theoretical constraints we consider are reflected in a working model
of information transmission. Second, we tie mental effort to an above-baseline spike rate,
providing a high-level model that provides hypotheses for an implementation-level in-
vestigation of mental effort. However, we emphasize that throughout the remainder of
the text, we are not proposing implementations of efficient information transmission in
the brain. We remain largely at Marr’s first level of analysis and ask, if the brain were
attempting to represent task-related information efficiently, what behavioral character-
istics might result? We engage in analysis at Marr’s second level by utilizing a model of a
rate code, but do so primarily to demonstrate the validity of our first-level analysis, and
to instantiate a code in which we can measure energy use. We hope that this approach,
which makes qualitative (and some quantitative) predictions, convinces the reader that
by assuming a driving process of efficient information transmission somewhere between
the sense organs and resulting actions, we gain some clarity and parsimony in under-
standing the phenomena associated with mental effort.
The remainder of the text is divided into three sections. In Section 5.4, we introduce
the reader to the relevant technical details of information theory, signal power, and
energy utilization. In doing so, we emphasize features that have qualitative parallels
in the behavioral psychology literature. We also briefly summarise the Bayes-Poisson
model described in Chapter 2. In Section 5.5, we enumerate the behavioral and neural
phenomena we would expect if mental effort in fact tracks transmission costs, and survey
the experimental results for each. For several of these phenomena, we provide a working
implementation using the Bayes-Poisson code that provides a qualitative, functioning
example of the principle in question. The goal of this section is to convince the reader
of the plausibility and parsimony of the information-theoretic explanation of mental
effort. In the final section, we discuss implications of the proposed models and highlight
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Figure 5.1: Channel model of information transmission. Adapted from [19], with per-
mission, and inspired by Shannon’s original diagram in [13].
remaining areas of uncertainty.
5.4 Energy, information, and time
In this section we provide a brief introduction to the relevant information-theoretic
concepts that we use in the remainder of the chapter. As formalized by Claude Shannon,
information transmission involves communication between a sender and a receiver (see
Figure 5.1). The receiver knows that some message will be sent, and has uncertainty
about the content of the message. The uncertainty is called ‘Shannon entropy’ or just
‘entropy’ and denoted H. Entropy can be quantified in bits, in which case it represents
the expected number of binary yes/no questions it would take to uniquely specify the
message sent. The sender transmits a message over a noisy medium, such as wires, sound
waves, or neurons, possibly coded so as to maximize the information transmission rate
over that medium. Information has been transferred from sender to receiver to exactly
the extent that the receiver’s entropy has been reduced.
We constrain our investigation to message transmissions in which a message is taken
from a finite alphabet and encoded through use of a codebook. In practice, this means
that a discrete message is converted into current perturbations, or pulses of light, or
neural spikes; our implementation is described in Section 5.5.
Messages are transmitted from the source with some relative frequency, described by
a probability distribution P . The receiver maintains a guess as to the message frequency
represented by a probability distribution Q. If Q 6= P , messages are generally longer
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than necessary (this is also true for source-coding, see [20] for in-depth discussion). As
discussed in Chapter 3, the expected extra message length is defined by the Kullback-
Leibler divergence between P and Q, denoted DKL(P (X)||Q(X)). In scenarios in which
the encoder is encoding messages by relying on an inaccurate model of the distribution
of the source, the message length will be longer than necessary. We return to this point
in Section 5.6.3, where we discuss the energetic costs of engaging in novel tasks.
5.4.1 Energy costs and mental effort
In a physical communication, a signal takes the form of some perturbation of a medium,
such as the electromagnetic field, the air, or the cross-membrane voltage of a neuron.
Perturbing the medium takes energy. The amount of energy used to affect this per-
turbation is referred to as the signal’s power. From basic physics we know that energy
quantifies the total power expended over time, where Pt represents power at time t:
E =
∫ T
0
Ptdt
If signal power is constant, we can simplify the expression to:
Energy Used = Power× Time
Signal power, integrated over time, describes the energy used in signal transmis-
sion. With the cursory discussion of the relationship between signal power, information
transmission rate, and energy utilization in hand, we offer the following analogy to the
phenomena of mental effort:
Energy Used = Power× Time (5.1)
Fatigue = Mental effort× Time (5.2)
We propose that this is more than just an analogy: we suggest mental effort is a phe-
nomenon that tracks instantaneous energy utilization in the service of tasks. However,
this simple model alone does not explain why, for example, energy utilization in service
of cognitively demanding tasks is effortful, while largely equivalent energy utilization
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(a) The total energy used when transmit-
ting a signal is the sum of instantaneous
signal power.
(b) Fatigue is hypothesized to reflect accu-
mulated mental energy utilization (though
only above a baseline rate, see also Figure
5.3).
Figure 5.3: Accumulation of fatigue. Fatigue is hypothesized to accumulate when the
spatially local rate of energy utilization exceeds a baseline rate of energy availability
provided by an outside source, e.g. blood glucose.
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in the visual cortex does not give rise to the same experience of effort. We propose
that the difference lies primarily in the variability of energy utilization. In brain regions
for which energy utilization rate is constant, the inflow of energy in the form of blood
glucose is a sufficient source of energy. For regions with task-related variability in ac-
tivation, it is conceivable that energy utilization rate occasionally exceeds the baseline
input rate (see Figure 5.3 for a schematic). In these cases, the brain region would need
to utilize an alternative source of energy such as astrocytic glycogen, which is a limited
resource. This proposal is currently an untested hypothesis, but it is plausible, and
we discuss experimental evidence related to glycogen utilization in Chapter 6. For the
purpose of this chapter, we simply suggest that dismissing the energy-effort connection
out of hand is unwarranted.
Nevertheless, we do know that sustained mental effort results in cognitive fatigue.
Behavioral evidence suggests that cognitive fatigue correlates with the inability to sus-
tain mental effort (and signal power), and leads to effects characteristic of sending signals
with lower power: slower response times and higher error rates. The remainder of the
chapter is dedicated to elaborating on these claims by instantiating them in simulation
results using a simple rate-coding model of neural firing, and then surveying related
findings in behavioral psychology.
5.5 A variable-length code
In this chapter we make the general claim that mental effort tracks signal transmission
costs, and specifically the energetic costs of transmitting information. In service of the
plausibility of this argument, we briefly review the Bayes-Poisson code introduced in
Chapter 2. The coding mechanism can be interpreted as a simple algorithm-level model
of a neural rate code which can be used to transmit variable-length messages. We use
this code to establish the neural plausibility of the proposals throughout this chapter and
to ground the theoretical considerations in a worked example. An important property
of the coding scheme which we did not emphasize in Chapter 2 is that coding costs can
be measured in ‘spikes’, where each spike costs a fixed amount of energy. Because of
this, the costs of task-related information transmission can be directly measured, and
the relationship between information throughput, task novelty, and energy costs can be
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directly quantified.
Recall that in the Bayes-Poisson model, messages to be communicated are taken
from an alphabet of discrete symbols As. The encoder consists of an array of Poisson
processes, each producing points or ‘spikes’ independently at a given noise rate λN .
In the basic model, the number of Poisson processes equals the number of symbols in
the alphabet, namely m. The codebook maps each symbol to a configuration of rates.
For simplicity, we use a ‘1-hot’ encoding, such that there is a correspondence of Poisson
processes to symbols. When a given symbol is transmitted, the rate of its corresponding
Poisson process is increased by a signal rate λS , to a total rate of λN + λS .
The receiver observes the sequence of spikes emitting from each Poisson process and
uses Bayesian inference with a prior distribution Q to infer which process is firing at the
higher λN + λS rate, and thus which symbol is being transmitted. We assume, again
for simplicity, that the receiver knows the values of both λN and λS .
The receiver begins each transmission at time t = 0 with an initial uncertainty
H(X) regarding the symbol being transmitted, reflecting its prior distribution P (X) of
the possible codewords. As time passes and observations Y = y accumulate, the receiver
accumulates information regarding which transmission is most likely and uses Bayes’
Rule to update the prior and obtain a posterior distribution P (X|Y = y) over messages.
The entropy of that distribution is calculated, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. When the
receiver’s entropy reaches a pre-defined threshold, the receiver stops observing. We
interpret the time between the beginning of observation and the observation stopping
time as the transmission time, or the response time.
In several of the sections below, we use this coding scheme to model the transmission
of task-relevant variables. In each case, we show that extra extra energy is required in
exactly the task circumstances that give rise to the feeling of mental effort.
5.6 Why some tasks are more difficult than others
In this section, we review the categories of tasks that induce a feeling of mental effort,
and describe how the demands in those tasks are related to their inherent information
transmission costs, in terms of average spike rate.
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Figure 5.4: Allocating more signal power improves performance in tasks requiring atten-
tion, working memory, and response conflict. (A) Higher signal power λS leads to faster
response times at the cost of greater energy use. (B) More power must be allocated to
transmit more information in the same amount of time. (C) In conflict-inducing tasks,
signal power must be allocated to overcome a ‘leak’ signal induced by distractor stimuli.
5.6.1 Attention
Attention is the term given to the process of accepting the deluge of raw input from
the ears, eyes, and other sensory organs, and selecting which parts should be made
available to executive processes, and which should be filtered out [129]. Humans and
other animals have some ability to ‘endogenously’ direct our attention in a ‘top-down’
fashion, making task-relevant information available to processes of executive control
while filtering irrelevant ‘noise’ [130]. Subjects are said to ‘allocate attention’ to a
particular set of environmental features. Attention is so closely associated with cognitive
effort that the two have been sometimes seen as identical [131]. In addition to the
target of attention, the degree of attention can be modulated at-will, often in response
to motivational incentives [131]. By increasing so-called ‘attentional gain’, subjects can
respond to stimuli more quickly and with higher accuracy. In this section, we show
how the Bayes-Poisson framework models attentional gain, and suggest that mental
effort corresponds to signal power, or more explicitly, energy use per unit time. The
model thus provides a mechanism for quantifying the energetic costs associated with
attentional gain.
Tasks requiring a high level of attention for a prolonged period are known as ‘vigi-
lance tasks’. In these tasks, subjects must monitor stimuli for infrequent changes that
may be difficult to perceive. Sustained engagement with such tasks requires ‘hard mental
work’ [82]. Sustained attention also leads to an accumulating feeling of mental fatigue
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and a decrease in performance over time [132]. Vigilant attention is associated with a
notable change in skin conductance response [133]. Intensive endogenous attention is
strongly correlated with the hallmarks of mental effort, and using it acts as a cost [134].
While some degree of attention is necessary to recognize stimuli and respond where
appropriate, deploying a higher degree of attention can reduce error rates [135] and
speed subject response times [136] in certain tasks.
The prevalent view of the neural implementation of attention suggests that the de-
ployment of attention increases neural firing rates in response to the ‘preferred’ features
of the stimulus, or the features to which the individual is attending [130, 137], thereby
increasing the signal-to-noise ratio of neurons responding to behaviorally relevant stim-
uli over a background rate. Recent work suggests that increased neural gain may serve
to increase the performance of behavioral response rather than improve the neural rep-
resentation of attended stimuli per se; this is particularly noticeable in situations with
visually similar but differently relevant stimuli [138]. This perspective supports recent
theoretical suggestions that neural coding of environmental stimuli may involve an opti-
mization for behavioral or energetic efficiency rather than maximize mutual information
with the environment [25], as assumed by the Efficient Coding Hypothesis [33].
We instantiate controllable attentional gain in our Bayes-Poisson model by changing
the signal rate λS allocated to the neuron ‘tuned’ to the presented stimulus, similar in
nature to neural gain models of attention, thereby increasing the ratio of the signal rate
λS to the noise rate λN (see Figure 5.5). The signal power λS represents spikes per
second, which translates directly to energy use per second. We model the variation in
attentional throughput by fixing a set of messages to transmit and varying allocated
signal power.
We model varying rates of ‘vigilance’ as energetic resources allocated to signal trans-
missions (though it may alternatively be captured as forced noise suppression, see e.g.
[24]). To capture the effect of changing signal power on information throughput, we
simulated 1,000 transmissions at varying signal powers for each of three entropy thresh-
olds. For each transmission, we calculated the information transmitted by computing
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the receiver prior and the receiver’s posterior
at decision time (see Chapters 2 and 2 for a more thorough discussion of this proce-
dure). Information throughput is computed as the information transmitted divided by
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Figure 5.5: Increasing signal power λS increases the rate of information transmission.
Information transmission rate was calculated by computing the transmitted information
as the KL-divergence of the receiver prior and the posterior at stop time, as described
in Chapter 2, and dividing by the total time taken for the transmission. Simulations
were performed with a noise rate λN of 10 spikes/s, and an entropy threshold of 0.5 bits,
with 4 possible messages and an initial receiver entropy of 2 bits. Entropy decreases
most quickly at start of the transmission and decays exponentially (see Figure 2.3 in
Chapter 2), so transmission rate is higher, on average, with a higher entropy threshold.
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the transmission time. As can be seen in Figure 5.5, throughput increases linearly with
allocated signal power. We suggest that this is a reasonable high-level model for the
relationship between mental effort (as indexed by signal power) and response time in
attention tasks, analogous to the way drift rate is associated with evidence accumulation
rate in the drift-diffusion model [22]. As discussed in Chapter 2, increasing signal power
also shortens average response times and decreases response time variance (see Figure
2.5).
5.6.2 Working memory
As with endogeneous attention, working memory is a cognitive resource whose exten-
sive use induces a feeling of mental effort. The term ‘working memory’ refers to the
maintenance of the value of task-relevant variables in a manner such that they can
be quickly retrieved and used to perform action selection [81]. Working memory is fa-
mously capacity-limited, but the nature of the capacity is still a matter of debate. While
early theorists modeled memory capacity as a set of discrete slots [31], recent research
supports models of memory as a variously allocated continuous resource [139]. Despite
growing acceptance of a continuous resource model of working memory, the nature of
the resource remains unclear. We suggest that the limited resource may be an energetic
resource, specifically the rate of available energy that can be allocated to maintaining
a particular signal with a low rate of error.
Some minimum maintenance of task-relevant variables is required to perform almost
any ecologically valid task, but extensive utilization of working memory is effortful and
aversive. Subjects seem to minimize demand for working memory use when possible,
leaving readily available information ‘in the environment’ to be accessed as needed rather
than incorporating it into a memory representation [85]. Subjects self-report a desire
to quit following tasks with a high working memory load, with larger memory demands
leading to a higher urge to quit [74]. Westbrook et al. devised a demand-selection task
in which subjects could choose to perform the N-back task with a high or low value of
N [65]. They found that subjects required a larger financial incentive to select a higher
value for N, thus preferring lower values of N for a given reward. These examples are
emblematic of a larger body of findings indicating that performance on working memory
tasks is sensitive to incentives [140, 141], which conversely suggests that subjects would
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rather not utilize a high level of working memory unless the intrinsic cost is offset by
some reward.
While a useful and full-featured model of working memory is beyond the scope of
this chapter, we suggest that working memory can be treated as the transmission of in-
formation from one point in time to another point in time. This recurrent-style memory
model is similar to the the rehearsal model of working memory [142]. Working memory
costs can be conceptualized as transmission costs, and capacity can be modeled as the
maximum rate of transmission given signal power constraints. If, as we suggest, effortful
working memory implies the possibility of variable resource allocation in the presence
of incentives, we could model changes in working memory capacity as a transmission
rate influenced by allocated signal power.
Behavioral findings suggest that both attention and working memory are subject
to controllable, variable use. Intensive use - either in terms of high attentional gain or
high working memory capacity with low error rate - is subjectively effortful, behaviorally
aversive, and results in eventual fatigue. We have presented a model that parsimoniously
describes these phenomena in terms of allocated signal power. Signal power must be
paid for with energy, a fact that immediately grounds our proposal in terms of available
energetic resources. If signal power is identified with neural gain, as seems reasonable
[143], the rate of available energy (in the brain, via blood glucose or astrocytic glycogen
reserves) becomes both a cost and a limitation. Incentives could induce a temporary
boost in signal power, but only to the extent that surplus energy is available (see Chapter
6 for further discussion).
5.6.3 Novel tasks
To observe that novel tasks are often difficult and error-prone is mundane; indeed, much
of psychological research considers this an axiom, an established truth from which we can
investigate properties of learning. Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of this phenomenon
and its presence on the list of task circumstances that induces mental effort requires
that it be included in any account that purports to explain mental effort. In this section,
we show that familiarity with a task can be modeled as an estimate of the probability
distribution of stimuli whose contents must be encoded and transmitted from a sender
to a receiver. As familiarity increases through practice, receiver expectations about
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stimulus probabilities become refined, making it possible to decode the same signal
with a shorter transmission.
Despite rarely being considered in the cognitive control literature, engagement with
novel tasks has the hallmarks of deployed control: engaged and focused attention, uti-
lization of working memory, a conscious awareness of the task goals, and deliberative
direction of behavior [144]. Engagement in novel tasks is experienced as effortful, as
anyone can attest who has learned to play an instrument or speak a new language. As
the task is practiced, however, it becomes progressively easier, often to the point of
being executed effortlessly or even habitually or automatically [26, 29]. Given that per-
formance of even relatively simple new tasks requires engagement of cognitive control,
an apparently expensive and constrained resource, some suggest that the complex set of
behaviors that characterize daily life is - and must be - largely composed of ‘automatic
response patterns’ [145]. Tasks once difficult are practiced until they become effortless;
once effortless, they can be performed quickly, effortlessly, and in parallel [78]; perhaps
all expertise is simply the result of practice [146].
We propose that novel tasks are costly, from the perspective of transmitting a signal,
because the transmission system is not optimized for the task in question. In variable-
length codes like the Hamming code and the Bayes-Poisson code, code length is a
function of the assumed probability distribution Q of the stimulus in question, that is,
of the messages to be transmitted. In a well-designed code, Q will be similar to the
actual source probability distribution of messages P . When beginning a new task, a
subject has no way of knowing P - yet must transmit task-related messages all the same.
How might this be possible? To answer this question, we can borrow the concept of
‘universal’ coding [20] from information theory.
A universal code is one which, while not optimized for any particular message dis-
tribution, should perform adequately for any expected distribution. Universal coding
can be thought of as the solution to a ‘game in which the coder chooses a code that
attempts to minimize the average length of the representation and nature chooses a dis-
tribution on the source sequence’ (see [20], p. 428). This is analogous to the situation a
person finds themselves in when beginning a new task: they are perhaps familiar with
the visual and auditory statistics of the environment, but they do not yet know which
environmental features are relevant to the task, or the frequency distribution describing
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those relevant features.
We can model this scenario with the Bayes-Poisson model by beginning a task with
a very large alphabet and a uniform Q distribution over transmitted signals. The
large alphabet reflects the idea that a subject can be able to recognize a high number of
stimulus configurations, each mapped to a symbol in the alphabet, and could potentially
encode and act on each if required by the task. However, the uniform distribution Q
over possible symbols represents a ‘universal’ code, and indicates that the subject is not
sure which stimuli will be relevant to the new task, or at what frequency.
It may seem counter-intuitive to suggest that subjects include stimulus configura-
tions in their alphabet that task instructions do not explicitly enumerate as important to
the task as hand. However, behavioral evidence reliably demonstrates that task novices
are more likely to notice and encode task-irrelevant stimuli than experts at the same
task. In a 2013 study of inattentional blindness [147], Drew et al. inserted a picture of a
gorilla in radiology images, in reference to the now-classic study by Simons and Chabris
[148]. Despite often looking directly at the location of the gorilla, experts typically
were not aware of the its presence. Experts presumably have a very-well-developed
Q distribution, which includes near-zero probability mass for stimulus configurations
that include gorillas, effectively eliminating the chance that any gorilla-related message
would be accurately transmitted. Novices, on the other hand, visually encoded and thus
were able to notice the contextually inappropriate feature of the stimulus.
Figure 5.6 gives the average cost of signal transmission, in terms of time, and thus
spikes and energy, as a function of the difference between Q and P . Unfamiliar tasks –
tasks for which the receiver does not have an accurate prior distribution over message
transmission frequency – are more costly on a message-by-message, and thus trial-by-
trial, basis.
Once again, claiming that task-related information transmission tracks mental ef-
fort allows us to make normative claims: novel tasks should be more effortful, because a
task-optimized code, or in our case a task-optimized prior, has not yet been developed.
The notion that the brain adapts neural rate codes to task statistics is a direct ana-
logue to the Efficient Coding Hypothesis [33, 37], which suggests that neural coding has
developed over a developmental and evolutionary timescale to efficiently represent stim-
ulus information in the natural environment - and implicitly requires that the coding
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Figure 5.6: Average response time, and thus the amount of Poisson spikes and energy,
increases roughly linearly with DKL(P ||Q). Simulations were performed with a signal
power λS = 10 spikes/s, noise power λN = 10 spikes/s, and an entropy threshold of
0.05 bits. A low entropy threshold is required to maintain relatively constant error rates
across values for DKL(P ||Q).
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mechanism incorporates stimulus statistics from the natural environment. The Efficient
Coding Hypothesis has been widely validated in early sensory systems [34, 35, 36]. We
suggest that it also takes place at the scale of learning, in which signal efficiency is
manifested as subject response times and a corresponding decrease in mental effort.
One interesting normative prediction of the development and use of task-specific
codes, in the form of task-indexed Q distributions, is that acquired skill on individual
tasks should not, as a general rule, transfer to other tasks. If our model of construct-
ing task-tailored codes from a universal source code is appropriate, we would expect
skills developed with over-practiced tasks to transfer less well than skills developed for
moderately-practiced tasks. In general, if a task is understood as a context upon which
a specific code is conditioned, or in which it is utilized, it is possible that practice effects
might fail to transfer to a formally similar task without appropriate contextual cues
[149].
5.6.4 Conflict
Some tasks evoke a tendency to produce responses that are not in accordance with the
task instructions. For example, in the ‘incongruent’ condition of the famous Stroop task,
subjects are asked to observe a color word, such as ‘GREEN’, drawn with a differently
colored ink (e.g. red), and report the color of the text itself rather than reading the
word [9]. When shown several words in sequence, subjects sometimes report semantic
content of the word rather than its ink color. The Stroop task is said to induce a ‘conflict’
in responses: on the one hand, the task instructions say to read the word color. On
the other, reading a word on a screen is habitual to the point of being involuntary:
it drives a subject’s ‘default’ response. In the typical framing, subjects who respond
correctly to the task are said to ‘override’ a ‘pre-potent response’ or ‘default action’
[91]. The override is necessary because the ‘habitual’ response creates ‘interference’
with the stated task instructions. The deployment of habitual override is often called
‘cognitive control’, to highlight the contrast with automatic recognition-driven responses
[59, 60, 91, 150, 106]. Cognitive control is colloquially said to ‘bring more resources
online’ and ‘reconfigure information processing away from default settings’. As with
attention and working memory, possibly because it is a construct not entirely separable
from those, cognitive control can be modulated. Increased control is demonstrated
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after errors on conflict-inducing trials, in the form of increased accuracy and decreased
response times (called the “Gratton Effect” [151]). The level of control is sensitive to
motivational incentives for correct responses [59].
Deployment of cognitive control while performing the Stroop task and other conflict-
inducing tasks such as the Stop-Signal task, Flanker task, or the Go/No-Go task induces
symptoms characteristic of mental effort. Subjects find such tasks aversive [88, 73], frus-
trating [70], fatiguing, and show a desire to quit [74]. Conflicting trials, and especially
errors on those trials, induce negative emotional affect [152, 69, 74].
The difficulty inherent in the Stroop task and other ‘conflicting’ tasks appears to
arise from their eliciting multiple responses simultaneously. In the language of signal
transmission we have been using, we might say that multiple signals are sent and super-
imposed in the incongruent and congruent conditions, whereas there is just one signal
in the ‘neutral’ condition. The superimposed signals could be either complementary (as
when the word and text color both indicate ‘green’) or contradictory (as when the word
is ‘red’ but the color and desired response is ‘green’). One of the signals - the one that
corresponds to task demands, in this case naming the color of the text - is desirable.
The other is habitual, a ‘leaky’ signal.
We model this leaky signal as shown in Figure 5.4C. The leak signal acts as a
particular type of channel noise, which biases the receiver towards the signal it represents
and slows the decrease of entropy. When the leak signal is congruent to the primary
signal (as defined by the task instructions), simulated response times decrease compared
to baseline. When the leak signal is incongruent to the primary signal, response times
slow. Both of these phenomena qualitatively replicate the “Stroop Effect”, matching
behavioral results shown in humans [153]. For simulated trials spaced evenly in time, the
incongruent condition requires roughly 33% more spikes to transmit the same messages
as the neutral condition, and 65% more than the congruent condition. From these
numbers, we would expect the incongruent condition to be more mentally effortful
than the congruent condition. This is qualitatively consistent with reported effort and
fatigue effects from participants engaged in the congruent and incongruent conditions
of the Stroop, Flanker, and other conflicting-signal tasks.
We explore the phenomenon of cognitive conflict in greater detail in Chapter 4. We
constructed a variation of theN -back task in which responses typically followed a regular
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Figure 5.7: Reproduction of the Stroop effect. Signal transmission time is affected by
the presence of super-imposed signals that are either congruent or incongruent with the
primary, task-instructed signal. Figure 5.4C shows an example of an incongruent signal.
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pattern. In doing so, we induced a habitual response that often predicted the same
response as task instructions, but not always. In cases where the habitual response and
instructed response conflicted, subject behavior showed hallmarks of conflict conditions
on other cognitive control tasks: slower response times and higher error rates. In this
case, however, it was not the stimulus itself that contained conflicting information, but
rather a combination of stimulus information, information stored in working memory,
and the prior expectation of a particular behavioral response. By incorporating the
habitual response into the Bayes-Poisson model as a prior on responses, we are able to
closely reproduce subject behavior with the model.
In the existing literature on response conflict and cognitive control, the existence of
conflict is sometimes considered to carry an intrinsic cost [152]. We propose a subtle but
important distinction between the energetic costs paid in service of task performance,
and the ‘meta-level’ costs associated with conflict monitoring. Suppose that conflict-
laden tasks are indeed more inherently effortful and costly to engage in at a high-
performance level, as we argue above and as is supported by behavioral evidence. If so,
such costs are arise directly as a result of task engagement. It is not the presence of
conflict per se that is expensive, but rather the additional energy that must be expended
(in the form of higher signal power or longer signal transmissions) that is costly. The
observed avoidance of conflicting tasks might be better understood as the avoidance of
the energy required to successfully perform the tasks, analogous to avoidance of tasks
that demand a high attentional load or working memory capacity. In short, conflict is
not special: it describes one of several task arrangements in which task success is only
achieved by spending a high amount of spikes.
Task switching
Switching from engagement in one task to another slows responses and increases error
rates in the time immediately following the switch [154]. Frequent task switching pro-
duces behavioral aversion [10, 73], subjective feelings of effort, eventual fatigue, and an
overall decrease in performance [155], all of which are characteristic of mentally effortful
tasks. But why should switching tasks be more effortful than engaging in each task sep-
arately? Performance decreases due to task switching are often explained by the need
to load task-relevant information such as instructions and environmental variables into
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working memory, or overriding the previously relevant stimulus-response associations.
We do not disagree with this view, though we feel that the high-level description of
‘task-set reconfiguration’ may explain the errors, but not the effort, that is associated
with task switching. To understand why task switching might be subjectively effort-
ful, recall that we have seen increased signal cost in two scenarios: (1) inappropriate
prior distributions over symbols (as in novel tasks), and (2) superimposed signals from
different attentional sets (as in conflict-inducing tasks). As we have shown, these both
lead to additional cost-per-signal on average. They also lead to a higher error rate, with
false-positives concentrated on outcomes with a high prior weight in the first case, and
on ‘conflicting’ stimuli in the second.
We propose that in the case of frequent task switching, the ‘task-set reconfiguration’
can be understood as altering what to attend to, and updating the frequency distri-
bution over the attended set. These correspond to the two mechanisms for error and
slowdown we have seen above. If, when switching from one task to another, these two
changes are not updated instantaneously, there will be a brief incompatibility between
the mechanisms supporting signal transmission and the requirements and statistics of
the task. As with novel tasks and conflicting tasks, we would expect this incompatibility
to manifest as slower response times, higher error rates, and a higher signal-cost-per-
message – in other words, a ‘residual’ switching cost, in both behavioral outcome and
energy-use-per-signal. When seen from this perspective, the residual costs arising from
task switching have the same structural source as those arising from a conflicting task
or a novel task.
5.7 Discussion
A similar experience of mental effort arises in seemingly unrelated tasks that require
extensive use of working memory or attention, novel tasks, tasks involving conflicts
between possible responses, and paradigms involving frequent task switching. We have
argued that in each of these cases, mental effort tracks signal transmission costs, and
high performance in tasks requires energy use above-and-beyond that required by a
baseline level of engagement. This perspective provides a principled connection between
information-theoretic task requirements and perceived difficulty, filling a large gap in
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the contemporary discussion on mental effort and cognitive control.
We propose that the Bayes-Poisson model described in Chapter 2 is a useful tool for
modeling information transmission in tasks, as it provides an explicit representation of
task cost in terms of transmission time and spike count. As we show in Chapter 4, the
Bayes-Poisson model produces error rates and response time distributions that closely
match human subjects in task conditions, while providing a theoretically principled way
of understanding why these behavioral parameters shift as a function of task demands
and structure. One goal of the current chapter is to encourage the use of the Bayes-
Poisson model in understanding other tasks as well.
The deeper hypothesis we have endeavored to articulate is that the cognitive pro-
cesses invoked in service of tasks can and should be measured in terms of energy utiliza-
tion. Using the Bayes-Poisson model, we have argued for the prima facie plausibility
that mental effort arises exactly when tasks require more energy, as measured by spikes,
to successfully complete. While there is little doubt that hypoglycemia hampers cogni-
tive function, any suggestion that cognitive operations utilize an operationally signifi-
cant amount of energy is currently met with skepticism. We hope to alleviate some of
this skepticism by demonstrating, via a simple model, a correspondence between spike
counts and information-theoretic task demands. As spikes cost energy, this perspective
unifies the computational and metabolic costs of task engagement.
The question of whether energy used in the service of tasks is of a large enough
quantity to impact cognitive function is still open. However, as sustained mental effort
leads to cognitive fatigue and a decrease in task performance that mimics the effects of
hypoglycemia, there is a strong argument to be made that mental effort is a symptom
of energy use above-and-beyond the rate of energy input from the blood stream. We
have argued that information transmission in service of task completion is limited by
available signal power, which corresponds to an available energy rate. However, we
have also remarked that this appears to be a controllable resource: attentional gain,
working memory capacity, and cognitive control in a conflicting task all appear to be
capable of effortful temporary improvement. When modeled as an increase in allocated
signal power, additional effort implies a temporarily higher rate of energy utilization.
In addition to the blood stream, energetic resources are stored in a spatially localized
distribution of astrocytic glycogen. As we discuss in Chapter 6, energy utilization whose
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rate exceeds the availability of glucose from the blood stream utilizes this finite resource.
It seems plausible that the phenomenological experience of mental effort reflects the
tapping of this resource. While some experiments have found little regionally specific
variation in energetic use as a function of task stimuli, these studies are primarily
focused on sensory systems already relatively optimized to efficiently code the natural
environment. We would expect task-related energy use increase and glycogen depletion
associated with mental effort to instead occur in regions of the brain that can be flexibly
reconfigured to meet task demands, such as the prefrontal cortex.
Our suggestion that information transfer in service of task completion is dependent
on available signal power, and thus available energy, closely conforms to notions of
bounded rationality originally articulated by Simon [156] and more recently by Griffiths
[157]. A limited energy input rate driving signal power, even if temporarily boostable,
bounds the fidelity of memory, the gain available to attention, and the degree over which
cognitive control can be applied.
By instantiating mental effort as arising from the energetic costs of information
transmission, we are able to cleanly distinguish between the often confused concepts of
cognitive control and self-control. Cognitive control, in the form of attention or conflict-
override, can be understood as energetic resources allocated to the task of information
transmission. Self-control, in contrast, is about reward scheduling. Performing the
Stroop task requires cognitive control; saying ‘no’ to a cookie requires self-control. We
lament that the debate surrounding ‘ego-depletion’ [113] has made it difficult to discuss
the connection between metabolic resources and cognitive processes. We do not remark
on whether self-control is a resource with metabolic limits (see [102] for a recent meta-
analysis), but we do claim that cognitive control is limited, as is borne out by ample
evidence.
The computational model we propose also sheds light on some longstanding puz-
zles in cognitive science unrelated to mental effort. We have argued that each task
requires the development of a probability distribution over transmitted signals, or stim-
ulus ‘states’, and have shown that this distribution improves with exposure to the task,
that is, with practice (see Chapter 3). With improved distributions come improved
response times. In learning a task, there are (at least) two distinct types of learning:
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learning a policy or stimulus-response mapping, and learning the probability distribu-
tion of task-related stimuli. Learning a policy increases subject accuracy; learning the
stimulus distribution takes longer, and produces improvements in response times long
after accuracy saturates. Tailoring an estimated stimulus distribution carefully to a
given task has an interesting downside: it will not be useful in performance of other
tasks. In effect, we predict a general lack of skill transfer between learned tasks, a phe-
nomenon that has puzzled researchers from Thorndyke (cited in [144]) to researchers
validating more modern ‘brain training’ regimes.
Finally, we comment briefly on the relationship between our current discussion and
the distinction made between ‘fast and slow’ [158] or ‘procedural vs deliberate’ [79]
thinking. ‘Fast’ or ‘procedural’ thinking is often identified as utilizing learned stimulus-
response mappings, in contrast to the ‘mental simulation’ of a ‘world model’ [159] used in
deliberate thinking. While this framing is useful and has been experimentally validated
to a large degree, it does not account for the phenomena associated with cognitive control
and mental effort cited here. In many of the laboratory tasks used to induce mental
effort, such as vigilance tasks, the N-back task, or the Stroop task, the instructions
are clearly explained to subjects, and subjects are often given enough practice to meet
baseline performance levels before experimental data is collected. In other words, the
subject is given a ‘policy’, and need not invoke any ‘world model’ or mental simulation
in service of these tasks. According to the fast-slow dichotomy, these tasks should
be fast, procedural, and easy. Nevertheless, the tasks are effortful and fatiguing. We
maintain that an information-theoretic quantification of the task requirements is the
missing explanatory piece of the puzzle.
Chapter 6
Cognitive cost as the dynamic
allocation of energetic resources
6.1 Overview
It is widely suggested that thinking is somehow costly, involving cognitive effort and
producing mental fatigue. Often these costs have simply been assumed to exist. Alter-
natively, they have been characterized as the brain’s assessment of lost opportunities,
or suggested to be metabolic but with implausible biological bases. We present a model
of cognitive cost based on the novel idea that the brain senses and plans for longer-term
allocation of metabolic resources by conserving neural activity. With it, we show how
a control-theoretic model that constrains decision-making within an energy budget can
explain cognitive effort avoidance in terms of an optimal allocation of limited energetic
resources. The model accounts for both subject responsiveness to reward and the detri-
mental effects of hypoglycemia on cognitive function. A critical component of the model
is using astrocytic glycogen as a plausible basis for limited energetic reserves. Glycogen
acts as an energy buffer that can temporarily support high neural activity beyond the
rate supported by blood glucose supply. The published dynamics of glycogen depletion
and repletion are consonant with a broad array of phenomena associated with cognitive
cost. Our model thus subsumes both the “cost/benefit” and “limited resource” models
of cognitive cost while retaining valuable contributions of each. We discuss how the
rational control of metabolic resources could underpin the control of attention, working
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memory load, cognitive lookahead, and model-free vs. model-based policy learning. The
text and images in this chapter are a modification of work published in [160].
6.2 Introduction
Cognitive processes that require vigilance, model-based lookahead, or extensive utiliza-
tion of attention or working memory are said to incur a cost [73], are called ‘aversive’
[71], and are characterized as computationally expensive [161]. General avoidance of
such processes makes us “lazy organisms” [162] and “cognitive misers” [163], who in
many circumstances would rather use “fast and frugal” heuristics [66] or habits [161]
than “intrinsically costly” deliberative thought [164]. Echoing Solomon’s “law of least
effort” [165], Balle suggested that humans follow a “law of least mental effort” [67],
always seeking the least cognitively expensive way of achieving a goal.
Such claims raise the question of why certain types of cognition are costly. What,
exactly, is being spent? Botvinick and colleagues have suggested that cognitive leisure
has inherent value, and that we forego this value by engaging in laborious cognitive
processes [164]. A recent paper by Kurzban et al. proposes that focusing limited
cognitive resources on a single task to the exclusion of other possible tasks carries an
opportunity cost [12]. In this model, a subjective feeling of fatigue is a signal to switch
to more worthwhile tasks. Kool and Botvinick propose that the avoidance of cognitive
demand is a fundamental principle of cognition, though the authors fail to specify why
cognition should be demanding [73]. These approaches are sometimes called economic or
“cost/benefit” models of cognitive cost, as they model subject behavior as attempting to
optimally trade costs (leisure, opportunity cost, cognitive demand) for benefits (reward,
leisure).
“Cost/benefit” models provide an explanation for the finding that increasing reward
in specific types of tasks can induce subjects to exert more cognitive effort [166, 167]
and improve executive function [168]. A pernicious drawback of “cost/benefit” models
is that they decouple the act of cognition from its fundamentally limited biological
substrate, the brain. As such, they are unable to convincingly account for the dynamics
of cognitive exertion and mental fatigue. “Cost/benefit” models are also fundamentally
divorced from the well established connection between blood sugar levels and cognitive
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function, a relationship familiar to every doctor and diabetic. As the blood sugar level of
an individual falls, precisely those processes that are considered costly are first affected
[112].
Another influential approach links cognitive costs to the utilization of a limited re-
source, presumably blood glucose [114]. In this model, use of costly processes diminishes
available glucose, leaving less fuel for future processes. Proponents of this assumption
typically focus on self-control, one instantiation of top-down executive control over be-
havior. In the frequently used “dual-task” paradigm, subjects are asked to perform
an initial “depleting” task involving extensive use of self-control. They are then asked
to perform a second demanding task. A commonly reported finding is that subjects
perform worse on the second task only if the first task was sufficiently demanding, and
the performance decrement can be eliminated by offering subjects a glucose drink [114].
Unlike “cost/benefit” models, “limited resource” models offer no mechanism by which
motivational factors can influence subject behavior. Additionally, reported blood sugar
decreases arising from cognitively demanding tasks (as reported in [111, 114]) are much
smaller than the changes required to effect task performance. Finally, the strength of
“limited resource” findings are coming under increasing scrutiny from post-hoc analyses
[99, 169].
In this chapter, we introduce a new model that treats cognitive resources as depend-
ing squarely on a metabolic substrate with explicitly specified dynamics, while still al-
lowing for the possibility of motivational factors to alter agent performance. We suggest
that an individual’s decision of whether or not to incur cognitive costs in a given situa-
tion can be fruitfully understood as one of decision making strategy : an agent will only
commit limited resources in cases where the payoff is worth it. Unlike “cost/benefit”
models, however, we treat resources as dynamically utilized and replenished. Much
like a marathon runner, an agent attempting to optimize long-term performance may
choose to purposefully limit exertion in order to maintain resource reserves for future
use. What may appear to be aversion to cognitive effort may in fact be strategic resource
allocation.
A view of the brain as engaging in cognitive strategy selection that is dynamic,
constrained, and which maximizes a objective function is naturally modeled using opti-
mal control theory. Using an optimal control theory framework allows and requires the
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modeler to be explicit about the dynamics of the system being modeled, the objective
function to be optimized, and the planning horizon of the agent. From this perspec-
tive, assumptions of limited resources and cost/benefit tradeoffs are not diametrically
opposed, as some have suggested [12], but are different components in a more general
framework. So-called “opportunity costs” are simply a special case in which an agent
has more than one task available to choose from. The “limited resource” assumption is
a special case in which system dynamics are specified but in which no explicit claim is
made about what is being optimized.
In what follows, we provide an optimal control model of energy use in the brain.
The model provides a novel explanation of cognitive costs as arising from intelligent re-
source allocation over time. We briefly review evidence supporting our specification of
system dynamics, objective function, and controls. We then discuss results from a com-
putational implementation of our model, and compare the effects of various modeling
assumptions. Finally, we discuss the implications of our model and suggest directions
for future work.
6.3 Dynamic resource control
6.3.1 Background
Optimal control theory is a mathematical approach to optimizing dynamic action se-
lection. Given a system with intrinsic dynamics, a controller repeatedly receives signals
from the system, estimates its state, and executes actions in order to optimize an ob-
jective function over time. We develop the hypothesis that the brain has an intelligent
control system for managing its use of metabolic resources by trading off performance
for reductions in neural activity. First we review the evidence for a control system view
of energy management in the brain and then develop a mathematical model of the same.
Cognitive fatigue and cost as energy depletion
Human cognition is a biological process operating within biological constraints. As
such, it is not surprising that hypoglycemia is known to cause performance decrements
in cognitive tasks. Moderate hypoglycemia, such as that arising from fasting, can impair
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cognitive performance in short term verbal [170] and spatial [171] memory, and the speed
of mental computation [172, 173, 122]. More severe hypoglycemia has been shown
to negatively affect performance in the Stroop task [174], multi-choice reaction time
tasks [174, 175, 176], the PASAT mental arithmetic task [175, 177], digit span tasks
[178, 179], the Tail Making B task [180, 181, 175], tracking performance [176, 180],
attentional tasks [182, 183], driving [184], and auditory processing [181], though some
studies report contradictory findings [185, 186, 182, 187] and high individual variation
in effects [174, 180]. In general, performance in tasks requiring only simple motor
functions (like the Finger Oscillation Test and Finger Tapping Task) are not affected
[186, 177]. Providing subjects a glucose drink after fasting can improve performance
[170, 171, 188, 186, 187]. Similar improvement was not found when subjects were given
a sweetened placebo in place of a glucose drink to raise blood sugar levels [188, 189, 190].
Some studies report decreased reaction time while others reported decreased accuracy.
We suspect that these differences can be explained by specifics of task design and reward
structure, though there is some evidence for an effect of individual differences during
mental fatigue [174, 180]. See [112] for a thorough review on the effects of glucose levels
on cognitive function.
Subjective mental fatigue and time-on-task can produce similar performance decre-
ments to hypoglycemia [191, 192]. As mentioned above, proponents of the “limited
resource” account of cognitive costs observe that the dynamics of cognitive fatigue and
performance degradation is consistent with the depletion of a limited resource. That
resource is largely assumed to be blood glucose. However, direct measurement of blood
sugar levels [111, 193] and metabolic rate [194] during cognitively demanding tasks
show effects that are too small to account for the detrimental effects on performance
that occur during a hypoglycemic state. We suggest that this apparent contradiction
can be explained by accounting for the energy storage and buffer mechanism provided
by astrocytic glycogen, in which glycogen is the limited, depleted resource. If this is the
case, glycogen-dependent neural activity should suffer when glycogen is depleted, while
extended cognitive load would have little or no effect on overall blood glucose levels.
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Figure 6.1: Energy flow between capillaries, astrocytes, and neurons. (A) Simplified ac-
count of capillary/glycogen/astrocyte relationship, modified from [198]. (B) A schematic
of our model, in which energy is treated as a single fluid flowing between compartments.
Lactate/GLUT labels are only for reference, as our model treats energy flow as the flow
of a single fluid. The model should be understood to represent dynamics in a small
region of the brain that has relatively uniform energy dynamics.
Brain glycogen as depletable energy resource
Glycogen is a storage form of glucose. In the human body glycogen is primarily found in
liver and muscle cells, but a small amount also exists in astrocytes. It has been estimated
that glycogen metabolism in astrocytes accounts for only 1-6% of energy use in the brain
under normal conditions [195]. Despite the small amount of glycogen utilization, the
amount of glucose stored in brain glycogen is thought to be greater than the amount of
non-glycogenic glucose in the brain ([196], cited in [197]). Moreover, studies of both in
vivo and in vitro glycogen metabolism show that its usage is critically linked to periods
of neural stimulation.
Figure 6.1A shows a simplified schematic of the relationship between capillaries,
astrocytes and neurons. Glucose from capillaries is transported to astrocytes and neu-
rons via facilitative glucose transporter proteins (GLUT1 for astrocytes and GLUT3
for neurons). Glucose is phosphorylated to glucose-6-phosphate upon entering an astro-
cyte. From there, it can be either stored as glycogen or converted to lactate. Lactate is
transported from astrocytes to neurons using monocarboxylate transporters [199].
In a series of in vitro experiments, Brown and colleagues investigated the dynamic
relationship between astrocytic glycogen and action potentials in the mouse optic nerve
in the presence and absence of glucose [200]. See Figures 6.2A and 6.2C for plots of
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the relevant dynamics. Axonal response to stimulation was measured using compound
action potential area, or CAP area. When glucose was removed from the environment
and neural tissue was stimulated, CAP area remained robust for up to 20 minutes,
during which time glycogen stores in astrocytes decreased in a remarkably linear fash-
ion. Glycogen content of astrocytes was strongly predictive of the duration of sustained
activity following aglycemia (see Figure 6.2C). In addition, inhibiting monocarboxy-
late/lactate transfer caused CAP area to decrease sharply rather than remains stable,
while introducing lactate sustained CAP area when glycogen was absent. These obser-
vations strongly indicate that astrocytic glycogen acts as a supplementary fuel reservoir
for neuronal activity. Moreover, in the presence of normal glucose levels, axonal stimula-
tion still led to a (less rapid) drop in astrocytic glycogen levels, indicating that glycogen
is utilized even in the presence of a normal concentration of glucose. Finally, CAP area
was maintained when lactate transport was blocked and a high concentration of glucose
was present, but not when the concentration of glucose was low, indicating that neurons
also use glucose directly (see [200] figure 3C, also [199]).
The link between neuronal stimulation and glycogen utilization is supported at a
larger scale by in research involving animal models. Choi et al. subjected rats to insulin-
induced hypoglycemia [201]. As brain glucose approached zero, brain glycogen content
(as measured using 13-C NMR) declined gradually and sustained brain activity for two
hours. Glycogen utilization has also been shown to increase by tactile stimulation of
rats [202, 203, 204].
Glycogen stores have been shown to increase during sleep [202], anesthesia and sus-
tained levels of high blood sugar [205], and to decrease during sleep deprivation [206].
Glycogen accumulates faster in regions of the brain that have highest synaptic den-
sity [207] and has a high concentration in the cerebellum, hippocampus, thalamus, and
striatum [208]. Finally, glycogen does not appear to be a passive reservoir, utilized only
when energy need exceeds resources. Glycogen can be synthesized and degraded simul-
taneously [209], and glycogen turnover rate increases in the presence of nearby neural
activity [210, 203]. Taken together, current evidence strongly suggests that astrocytic
glycogen acts as a energy shunt or reservoir that is depleted during periods of high
neural activity and repleted during rest, a shunt into which energy is consistently being
deposited and released. This stored energy can support neural activity that exceeds the
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of energy dynamics used in our model (right) with experimental
data (left). (A) Recorded CAP area in a mouse optic nerve (squares) and glycogen
content (bars). The nerve was stimulated in a solution with no glucose. Note that
glycogen is not further depleted after reaching ≈ 25% of its original level. Figure
recreated using data from [200]. (B) A simulation of the same situation as (A) using
our model. To simulate aglycemic conditions, the energy flow from the capillary, EB was
set to 0 for the duration of the simulation. (C) Recorded CAP area in the mouse optic
nerve in vitro as a function of time and the initial glycogen content in nearby astrocytes.
At 20 minutes, the solution was replaced with a solution containing no glucose. Figure
replotted using data from [200]. (D) A simulation of the same situation as (C) using
our model. The absence of glucose in solution was modeled by again setting EB = 0 at
20 minutes. In our model, astrocytic energy level ranges from 0 to 100, arbitrary units.
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instantaneous resources of available glucose, and is replenished during rest.
6.3.2 Optimal control
An optimal control problem is fundamentally defined by system dynamics, controller
sensors, and an objective function. In the model we present, energy resources in the
brain have intrinsic dynamics and represent the system to be controlled. The system
state consists of the resources available in different areas of the brain, namely the energy
residing in astrocytes, and neurons. The system dynamics describe energy flow between
capillaries, astrocytes and neurons within an area. Control of the system takes the form
of increasing and decreasing energy usage rate. In neural terms, we interpret this control
as the change in concentration of some excitatory neuromodulator. An increase in
neuromodulator concentration increases neural excitability and the recruitment of more
active neurons, with which task-related energy utilization increases linearly. Actual
neural recruitment and associated energy utilization depends on available resources, so
the energy flow out of neurons is a function of both the excitatory concentration and
available energy. The population of recruited neurons maps to performance using a
task-specific performance curve (see Figure 6.3).
In an optimal control problem, a controller attempts to optimize an objective func-
tion (also called an objective function) over time. We assume that the objective function
includes rewards given for task performance. Whether the objective function should in-
clude cognitive costs (indeed, the very phrase “cognitive costs” belies the implication)
is an open question. The received wisdom is that cognitive costs are something to be
avoided for their own sake - that is, they belong in the objective function. We suggest
the possibility that apparently “costly” cognitive processes are instead avoided because
they strongly affect energy resource availability, and hence performance at longer time
scales. If an agent has the capacity to plan, they may judiciously use resources in order
to maximize reward over time. Indeed, the model we propose herein suggests a method
for discerning whether cognitive costs can be said to exist per se (see Section 6.4.1).
Our proposed mapping between the optimal control framework and brain energy
dynamics is given in Table 6.1. The goal of the controller is to execute a sequence of
control actions that minimizes the objective function over a given time horizon. The
objective function J , shown in Equation 6.1 for a time horizon n and initial state x0, is
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Figure 6.3: Different curves can represent either different policies/strategies for the
same task or different tasks. Note that as resources are depleted, the maximum possible
energy utilization rate drops (see Figure 6.4C), creating the possibility of a different
strategy or task being optimal based on energy dynamics alone. This provides a natural
explanation for task or strategy switching as a result of fatigue.
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Control theory Variable Interpretation
Time index k Index of time at a scale in which distinct
control actions are possible
State xk = [HN , HA] Quantity of energy available to neurons
and astrocytes
Control u Neuromodulator concentration driving
neural recruitment in an area
Dynamics xk+1 = f(xk, uk) Energy dynamics in the brain
Objective function g(xk, uk) Combination of cognitive costs (if any)
and rewards for a single time step
Overall cost J Overall objective to be optimized within a
given time horizon
Table 6.1: Proposed relationship between a control theoretic framework and the opti-
mization of energy use in the brain over time.
additive in that it is the sum of costs at each time step k.
J(x0) = E
{
n∑
k=0
g(xk, uk)
}
(6.1)
Energy dynamics operate at varying temporal and spatial scales. The model we
introduce in the present work is intended to represent neural dynamics on the time
scale of roughly 20 minutes to several hours, as that is the time scale of glycogen de-
pletion and subjective mental fatigue. The spatial scale of our model is a local brain
region with homogeneous energy resources, subserving some particular cognitive func-
tion. Elsewhere in this chapter, we consider cognitive functions like working memory,
executive control, and attention to be candidate functions as they are sensitive to both
energetic resources and reward, but in the present model we treat only a simplified cog-
nitive function whose utilization maps to performance in a 1-dimensional manner. This
function is intended to be the simplest case of an energy- and reward-sensitive cognitive
function, and more investigation is needed to understand how specific functions like
attention or working memory should be modeled. We envision energy dynamics being
regulated across several regions (and functions) at longer time scales, however, here our
goal is to develop an area-specific control model whose extension to the full brain via
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hierarchy and composition is the subject of future work.
We model the task-related dynamics of energy use using a compartmental fluid flow
model and show that our model is consistent with available data. We then show how
neural activity can be modulated to control metabolic usage and maximize long-term
task performance.
Dynamics model
We use glycogen-supported energy transfer as a dynamics model in our optimal control
approach to modeling cognitive costs. As we are at present introducing a model that we
hope is qualitatively useful, we will use a greatly simplified model of energy flow from
capillaries to astrocytes to neurons. Astrocytic glycogen and glucose is treated as one
energy pool, and neuronal lactate and glucose is treated as another.
The model we propose is illustrated in Figure 1B. In this model, energy (in the form
of glucose) flows from capillaries to both astrocytes and neurons. We model energy flow
as a fluid flowing from capillaries into astrocyte and neuron “buckets” connected by a
pipe. Though molecule transfer occurs via transporter-facilitated diffusion, we make a
simplifying assumption and model the transfer of energy as the flow of a liquid though
containers, constrained only by the “radius” of connecting pipe. Liquid flow between
the two buckets is governed by the Torricelli Model, in which the change in height of
the fluid in a bucket is proportional to the square root of the fluid height. Each bucket
is treated as “leaky”, leaking into the other bucket.
The fluid flows from a capillary reservoir to both neurons and astrocytes at a certain
rate. Astrocytes are modeled as having a greater energy/fluid capacity than neurons.
Energy can flow freely from astrocytes to neurons and back via a pipe at the base of
both containers (this models lactate transfer between cells). Fluid levels naturally move
toward equilibrium in connected vessels. Energy/fluid can flow out of neurons via a
variable rate active pump. The requested rate of pumping, or energy utilization, is the
single control variable of the system.
The modeled relationship between requested energy utilization and actual utilization
is not linear. If the level of energy in a neuron is zero, clearly no energy is present to be
utilized. Inspired by dynamics illustrated in [200], we model the relationship between
requested energy utilization and actual energy flow as a bounded exponential. The
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Figure 6.4: Visual display of the relationship between control/neuromodulation (u),
energy availability (HN ), energy use (Euse), neural recruitment (NeuralRecruit(x, u)),
and performance (Perf(x, u)). Curves were generated using the equations from 6.5 and
parameters from Table 6.2. (A) The relationship between control/neuromodulation and
energy utilization is modeled as linear, with the slope controlled by the amount of energy
available to neurons. (B) Performance as a function of control/neuromodulation on a
specific task at different levels of energy availability. This figure illustrates that the
same performance can be achieved with different levels of available energy through the
application of varying levels of control/neuromodulation. (C) Energy utilization has an
upper bound and is affected by both control/neuromodulation and energy availability.
actual energy utilization rate depends on both the energy level in the neuron and the
requested rate. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 6.4. The combined dynamics
equations are shown in equation set 6.3.
xk+1 = f(xk, uk) (6.2)
xk+1 ≈ xk + dx
dt
(xk, uk)∆t
where dx/dt is the differential change in the state given by
dx
dt
=
[
dHA/dt
dHN/dt
]
=
[
Between-compartment flow + Inflow from capillaries
Between-compartment flow + Inflow from capillaries−Outflow
]
=
[
aconnector
aA
√|HN −HA| · (HN −HA) + αEB
aconnector
aN
√|HA −HN | · (HA −HN ) + βEB − Euse(u,HN )
] (6.3)
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The energy outflow Euse is a function of energy demands due to the neural excitability
control level u and the current neural energy availability HN .
Euse(u,HN ) = γu(1− e−δHN ) (6.4)
Each of the model parameters has a simple interpretation:
• HA, HN : amount of energy in astrocyte and neuronal compartments, respectively
modeled as fluid heights.
• u: energy outflow “demand” due to neural activity. This is akin to neuromodulator-
induced neural recruitment in the brain, modulating energy use with task de-
mands.
• Euse(u,HN ): energy outflow rate as a function of demand and availability. This
relationship is modeled as a bounded exponential to account for both a zero rate
of flow for an empty compartment and an upper bound of energy utilization.
• aA, aN : energy capacity of astrocytes and neurons, respectively.
• aconnector: parameter controlling the energy flow rate between the astrocyte and
neuron compartments.
• α, β: parameters controlling the energy flow rate from the capillary to the astro-
cyte and neuronal compartments, respectively.
• γ: scaling parameter controlling the utilization of energy as a function of neuron
energy level.
• δ: parameter controlling the sensitivity of energy use to low energy availability.
• EB: energy content of the blood. Used to modulate the overall flow of energy into
the neuron and astrocyte buckets and simulate hyper- and hypoglycemia.
Cost model
The goal of the controller is to optimize the objective function over a given time horizon.
Each time step k is an instance at which controls can be executed. The time scale is
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intrinsically set by the system dynamics. In our case, it is the time scale at which an
agent can change its level of cognitive effort. This is not necessarily the same as the
time scale of a given task.
The relationship between attempted cognitive control u, resource availability [HN , HA],
and performance is illustrated in Figure 6.4. Cognitive control is mapped to task per-
formance in a two step process. First, requested control is converted into actual energy
utilization in a fashion that depends on the amount of energy available to neurons. En-
ergy utilization is assumed to reflect neural recruitment for a particular task, which could
affect working memory load, attention, vigilance, or any other cognitive resources that
are variable and contribute to task performance. Then, energy utilization is mapped to
performance through a task-specific performance curve. Example performance curves
are shown in Figure 6.3. Each line represents a possible relationship between resource
utilization and performance for a given task, or different strategies on a single task.
Our model assumes that resources can be utilized at a rate dependent on the available
energy level. If different tasks or strategies are available as in Figure 6.3, an agent might
change tasks or strategies (or “policies”, in the terminology of optimal decision making)
in order to maintain optimal performance. The availability of a set of performance
curves dependent on resource levels, whether they represent tasks or different strategies
for the same task, provides a natural explanation for task and strategy switching that
does not rely on theoretical constructs like “opportunity costs”.
Equation set 6.5 represents the control-to-performance relationship at time step k.
The cost g(x, u) for a state-control pair is calculated to be a linear combination of the
control u and task performance (which is assumed to translate directly to reward).
g(x, u) = λu− Perf(x, u)
Perf(x, u) =
1
1 + e−NeuralRecruit(x,u)
NeuralRecruit(x, u) = γeEuse(x, u) + γf
Euse(x, u) = δu(1− e−γHN )
(6.5)
where Perf is the performance curve relating neural recruitment and energy consump-
tion to task performance. NeuralRecruit represents the population size recruited given
the energy use. Parameter values in γe and γf were chosen to make the variable part
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of Perf have the same scale as the glucose usage Euse. The control component of this
sum is represented by the λu term.
When λ > 0, the control variable u influences the objective function, in which case
cognitive control can be said to be intrinsically costly. While we expressed costs in terms
of control (which is traditional for optimal control theory), we could have equivalently
used the linear relationship between u and energy use, to express the costs in terms
of energy use, or nonlinearly in terms of neural recruitment. Thus, λ represents both
a gain on control cost and a unit conversion factor. We explore the implications of
different values for λ in Section 6.4.
6.3.3 Model discussion
Energy dynamics in the brain can be understood to operate at several temporal and
physical scales. At the smallest scale, glutamate must be rapidly (≈ 10ms [211]) se-
questered following firing to prevent glutamate toxicity. This operation is performed
much more quickly than increased regional cerebral blood flow and is thought to be
powered by the rapid utilization of astrocytic glycogen (see [212]). At the scale of min-
utes and hours, high levels of neural activity deplete glycogen stores. This is the scale at
which our model is focused. Blood glucose concentration is affected by exercise and food
consumption. In our model, the flow of energy from capillaries to astrocytes directly
affects the replenishment rate of glycogen (modeled as energy level in the astrocyte
bucket). Flow from capillaries to astrocytes and neurons limits the maximum neuronal
firing rate following glycogen depletion, in which case energy is utilized as soon as it
enters the neuron bucket from the astrocyte bucket or capillary.
As mentioned above, the proposed model allows for a simple explanation of activity-
induced cognitive deficits reported in the ego depletion literature. Baumeister and col-
leagues propose a resource-depletion framework in which self-control (and possibly other
cognitive functions) deplete a limited resource [193]. They suggest that this resource
may be blood glucose [193, 114], citing the common finding that a meal or glucose drink
eliminates cognitive or self-control deficits that follow a demanding task. Instead, we
propose that it is glycogen stores that are depleted in the presence of sustained cogni-
tive effort. In the absence of increased blood sugar levels, performance should suffer
following glycogen depletion. On the other hand, increasing blood sugar levels increases
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instantaneous transfer of glucose from capillaries to astrocytes and neurons, providing
energy to support normal levels of firing even in the case of glycogen depletion.
Glucose in the blood is treated as an infinitely large resource pool from which re-
sources are extracted at a set rate. In principle, blood glucose could be modeled as a
finite pool larger than that of astrocytes. With the exception of Brown (2003) [200],
few results exist detailing glycogen dynamics on the time scale of our model, and for
this reason model parameters were selected to match glycogen dynamics results found
in that paper. A comparison of our model dynamics in hypoglycemic conditions with
mouse optic nerve data from [200] can be seen in Figure 6.2. The figures highlight the
effect of varying astrocytic glycogen content on the duration of sustained neural activity.
Costs
Researchers have observed for decades that certain cognitive functions are aversive [40],
necessitating in turn that humans exhibit a tendency to rely on habits [161] or heuristics
[66] to perform tasks. Many suggestions have been made as to the nature of the cost
driving cognitive aversion: for example that cognitive effort requires foregone leisure
[164], that cognitive costs are a form of opportunity costs [12], or that costs are related
to the need for extensive cognitive processing [73, 71].
Despite widespread agreement that cognitive effort is aversive, very little work has
been done to quantify this aversion. We propose that a useful way to quantify aversion
is in terms of foregone reward. The ability of incentives to induce task engagement is a
standard operating assumption in experimental psychology and neuroscience. Extrinsic
monetary or caloric reward is only one type of reward and is often compounded by and
competes with other extrinsic (social, sexual) and intrinsic (curiosity, empowerment,
mastery) rewards for impact on decision outcomes. However, it is easily quantified and
has been shown to impact cognitive effort (see [166] for a review). We therefore restrict
our treatment of reward to extrinsic reward for task performance (e.g. monetary),
though other reward types could in principle be accounted for.
Reward and cognitive effort appear to balance in some way, resulting in a decision
regarding whether or not to deploy effortful cognitive strategies. To our knowledge, only
one group has attempted to quantify aversion to cognitive effort in terms of foregone
reward. Braver and colleagues rewarded subjects for completing an N -back task [65].
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After an initial familiarization phase, subjects could make choices of whether to complete
a more difficult task (higher N) for more money, or a less difficult task (lower N) for less
money. Subjects were explicitly told that reward was contingent on maintaining effort
rather than performance. In this way, the researchers effectively determined the amount
of money subjects were willing to forego in order to avoid a cognitively demanding
increase in N . They found that the subjective value of each level of N , or the amount
by which increasing N decreases the preference for an offered reward, decreased linearly
with the magnitude of N . These results are fully consistent with the additive objective
function, although we suspect a more complex objective function will be needed as
experimental results become rich enough to invalidate a linear approximation. However,
the deeper implication is that for difficult tasks, by suitably increasing the offered reward
the subject will eventually overcome task aversion and attempt the task. For a recent
review of neuroeconomic approaches to understanding cognitive effort, see [127].
Controls
By treating cognitive effort as a resource control problem we are assuming the brain
has mechanisms that allow control of cognitive effort and that varying effort affects
subsequent reward. We believe there are limitations on both the ability to control
resource allocation as well as limits on the impact that effort has on performance.
Evidence suggests that cognitive effort can increase performance in certain tasks but not
others. Camerer and Hogarth reviewed research investigating the relationship between
financial incentives and performance in experiments. Their findings were nuanced [166].
Higher incentives do not appear to improve performance in a wide range of task types,
including tasks requiring insight (an “ah-hah! moment”). Incentives can consistently
harm performance in judgment and decision making tasks in which expert judgment
can routinely be out-performed by a simple rule based on quantifiable observations. In
this type of task, incentives appear to induce subjects to expend greater deliberative
effort, weighting their own (inaccurate) judgements more highly than the predictions
of formulas. To be clear, in these tasks incentives appeared to increase effort, but
not objective performance. One simple way to reconcile these results is to assume the
existence of both model-based high-cost deliberative neural computations and low-cost
model-free experience-based paths [79], with the switch to deliberative decision-making
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resulting in a reduction in performance in cases where model-free solutions are superior.
In addition, incentives are most likely to improve performance in a subclass of judg-
ment and decision making tasks, specifically tasks that are “effort-responsive.” These
tasks critically depend on the cognitive functions which are the strongest candidates as
controllable resources. In tasks where these functions operate, extrinsic motivation can
“improve recall of remembered items, reduce the effect of anchoring bias on judgment,
improve some kinds of judgments or predictions, improve the ability to solve easy prob-
lems, and also sharpen incentives to make zero-profit trades in auctions or do piece-rate
clerical work” [166]. These tasks share a reliance on the use of executive function and
working memory resources. For our purposes, the important finding is that in a specific
but useful set of task types, monetary incentives can explicitly increase the utilization
of the exact cognitive faculties that are considered cognitively costly.
There is currently insufficient data to enable us to identify a specific molecular
mechanism for the proposed control. However, given the aforementioned connections
between metabolic resource levels and offered reward on the one hand, and subject
effort and performance on cognitively demanding tasks on the other, it is reasonable
to posit the existence of some signal by which neuronal gain is modulated according to
both the availability of metabolic resources and reward signals. One proposal for such
a signal is some subset of neuromodulators associated with behavioral vigor acting on
local excitatory neural gain via glutamate and glycine, though future research is needed
to confirm this hypothesis. Botvinick and Braver (2015) provide a review of the possible
neural mechanisms of cognitive control, and suggest dopamine as a candidate control
signal [213].
Model
The control variable in our model is a brain region-specific increase in neural excitability
which we assume serves to recruit more neurons and consume more energetic resources.
This control can also be understood as a requested size of a neural population ded-
icated to a particular task, with the request coming in the form of some excitatory
neuromodulator. This control mechanism is compatible with modulation of attention
[214], and probably working memory. However, we also acknowledge that there is an
excellent case for an alternative mechanism for cognitive control by switching between
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decision making systems or policies that differ in costs and performance but can solve
the same task. Many recent models of cognitive effort take this approach and simplify
the graduation in cognitive effort into two categories of decision-making processes such
as “System 1” and “System 2” [215], procedural and deliberative [], or model-free and
model-based [79] (for a review of dual-process models of decision making, see [216]).
We believe a complete account of the control of cognitive effort will incorporate both of
these control mechanisms (graded neural recruitment and strategy switching), a point
we return to in the general discussion.
An important implication of interpreting the cost as something to be minimized over
time is that agents optimizing Equation 6.1 are not myopic: an agent may choose an
action that decreases an instantaneous reward in order to maximize reward in the long
run. In the context of cognitive costs, there are two basic possibilities:
1. An agent avoids demanding cognitive processes because they are intrinsically
costly. In this case the use of such processes would be explicitly represented
in the objective function. This is the approach implied by McGuire and Botvinick
[71] and elsewhere.
2. An agent generally avoids demanding cognitive processes because doing so opti-
mizes reward in the long run.
The second option is analogous to the situation a runner finds herself in when com-
peting in a marathon: sprinting at the beginning of the run is locally optimal but
globally disastrous, because this strategy quickly exhausts the limited resources avail-
able. Analogously, it is possible that aversion to cognitively demanding processing is
not a cost per se, but a strategic use of a limited glycogen reservoir. If this is the case,
an aversion to certain cognitive processes may appear to indicate a cost but instead
be a long-run performance-preserving strategy. In this case, cognitive costs might not
belong in the objective function at all. Our approach encompasses both views, with
zero λ parameter in Equation 6.5 for the long-run view, and positive λ for the intrinsic
cost view. We explore the predictions made by each of these assumptions in Section
6.4.
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Fatigue
In order to effectively utilize control actions, a controller must maintain an estimate
of the current state. We propose that a key signal carrying the current energy level
maps onto subjective fatigue. One might be tempted to suggest that mental fatigue and
associated performance decrease is a consequence of resource depletion. Experimental
findings contradict this, indicating instead that sufficiently high motivational incentives
induce cognitive effort in spite of subjective fatigue [217].
We suggest that fatigue is not a signal of total resource depletion but of impend-
ing depletion if the current rate of use is maintained. In other words, subjects feel
fatigued when glycogen stores are anticipated to deplete at current usage, and fatigue
is a relatively crude signal of partial depletion.
The link between subjective fatigue and partial glycogen depletion has experimental
support [218]. Thus fatigue serves as an important signal enabling subjects to estimate
their energy state and plan their cognitive strategy accordingly. If immediate incentives
warrant further use of a costly strategy, an individual may indeed temporarily continue
its use. The implication by critics is that this should be impossible if a resources is in
fact depleted and therefore unavailable for further utilization. If fatigue indeed reflects
only partial glycogen depletion, this criticism becomes irrelevant. We would nevertheless
predict that at a long enough time scale, individuals would become fatigued beyond the
point of incentives to improve performance because the required resources simply would
not be available. While this proposal suggests a global signal for resource depletion,
we believe that cognitive fatigue has gradations across brain areas which may produce
task-dependent fatigue.
6.4 Simulations
We implemented our model with the dynamics, controls, and costs specified above.
The optimal control framework allows (and forces) us to be explicit about an agent’s
lookahead and the components of the objective function. As mentioned in Section 6.3.3,
it is unclear whether aversion to expensive cognitive processes is the result of their being
intrinsically costly or simply an effect of long-term strategy. This ambiguity allows us
to consider a space of models as indicated in Figure 6.5, with axes representing planning
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Figure 6.5: Style of behavior depends on lookahead and cost. The model is agnostic as
to both the intrinsic cost of control (i.e. whether control is included in the objective
function of the optimal control formulation) and the planning horizon of the agent.
This flexibility highlights the generality of the optimal control approach. Each choice
of planning horizon and intrinsic cost results in an agent with a distinct optimization
strategy.
horizon and the intrinsic cost of cognitive effort. On the extremes of the planning axis,
we can treat an agent as acting either myopically, with a decision based on only current
costs and rewards, or optimally, with a lookahead equal to the time horizon of the
task. On the intrinsic cost axis, we can omit costs arising from the cognitive control
completely (low costs), or we can include control costs directly in the reward function
(high costs). We assume for simplicity that the agent has error-free access to the current
state and system dynamics, though in future work we intend to relax this assumption,
as these errors may be critical for explaining behaviors that are essentially “illusions of
cognitive costs”.
Implementation
Optimal control solutions were calculated using dynamic programming for the model
in two experiment described below. In both cases the model was implemented with the
values for constants listed in Table 6.2.
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Name Value
Initial HN , HA 100
aconnector 0.5
aA 10
aN 1
α, β 0.00042
δ 0.05
γ 0.02
γe 6
γf 5
EB 100
Table 6.2: Constants used in the computational implementation of the model. For an
explanation of parameter values, see Section 6.3.2.
The dynamics used are listed in Equation set 6.3. The objective function for each
step k is given in equation 6.5. Each dimension of the state space had a range [0, 100].
The state space was discretized to integer values. Transitions were probabilistic based
on the fractional part of each dimension of the new state. For example, a value of 2.1
would be discretized as “2” 90% of the time, and “3” 10% of the time. At each time
step, control levels were chosen from were chosen from U = [0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
A control action was taken at each time step k. The temporal resolution for the
dynamics model was higher than that of the control actions, so once a control action
was selected, the system was run forward 100 iterations using Euler integration while
maintaining the selected control.
The optimal control strategy was calculated using dynamic programming for a dis-
crete state space as described in [219]. To represent the conditions described in Figure
6.5, simulations were performed for lookahead values of 1 and 100. In the first case, the
control cost is simply treated as the single state’s g function and the control is chosen
according to
uselected = argmin
u∈U
g(xk, u)
With a lookahead equal to the N , the control at each step is chosen recursively
according to
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Figure 6.6: Results from Simulation 1, separated by agent lookahead and intrinsic cost
(see also Figure 6.5). Each curve represents an optimal control trajectory under the
given conditions. As expected, agents with a longer lookahead and lower intrinsic costs
exhibit better performance while generally exercising less control (less neuromodula-
tion).
uselected = argmin
u∈U
{gk(xk, u) + Jk+1}
where Jk+1 is the minimum cost-to-go from step k + 1 onward.
Simulation 1
In the first simulation, a finite time horizon of N = 100 was used and reward (equal to
performance) was assumed to be available for the duration. Optimal control trajectories
were calculated for lookahead values of 1 and 100 and for λ = 0, 0.1, 0.4. The value
λ = 0 reflects the case in Figure 6.5 in which cognitive costs are not included in the
objective function. As discretization of the state space led to stochastic state transitions,
simulations were run four times and results were combined using LOESS smoothing.
Control, resource, and performance trajectories for each combination of lookahead
and λ are shown in Figure 6.6. The simulation results reveal several important patterns.
First, a higher control level is sustained when cognitive costs are not included in the
objective function λ = 0. In addition, control strategies that include a lookahead of 100
maintain glycogen levels that are much higher than those maintained by no lookahead.
This result reflects strategic resource allocation over time, a feature that is not present
with the agent cannot foresee system dynamics in the longer term.
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The most important result relating to the discussion above is that when a looka-
head is included, the optimal solution is to sacrifice performance initially in order to
maximize overall performance. Comparing the initial requested level of control (that
is, allocation of neural resources) and resulting performance with the long-term per-
formance curve, one is again reminded of a marathon runner. Without the ability to
predict the depletion of resources and its effect of resource depletion on performance,
the agent initially requests a high amount of resources. This quickly decreases the level
of astrocytic glycogen, which leads to a lower sustainable performance level and overall
lower performance.
To rephrase this result in terms used above, what appears to be an initial aversion to
cognitive costs is actually a strategic decision to avoid resource depletion and maximize
long-term reward.
Simulation 2
In the second simulation, reward was made unavailable for certain periods, simulating
conditions where no reward is available to the agent (resting between experimental tasks,
for example). The dynamics, parameters, and objective function were identical to those
used in Simulation 1, with the exception that the performance function returned 0 for
two periods of time, regardless of energy level or control action. The simulation was run
five times for 500 steps, and again the results were combined using LOESS smoothing.
Simulation traces are shown in Figure 6.7. Though control was not incorporated
in the objective function, the control action was nonetheless moderate throughout the
simulation. Control was minimal during the no-reward periods, as expected. That the
control does not appear to be a step function at the transition points is due to the
smoothing method used. As also seen in Baumeister’s dual-task ego-depletion exper-
iments, performance was highest in the first rewarding period and diminished in the
second. Though astrocytic energy levels rebounded somewhat during rest periods, the
requirement of a minimal level of control (u = 0.5 rather than u = 0) meant that avail-
able energy was never fully replenished. This is in accordance with evidence suggesting
that astrocytic glycogen is slowly depleted during waking hours and substantially re-
plenished during a few hours of sleep [202, 206].
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Figure 6.7: Results from Simulation 2, with zero intrinsic cost and a lookahead of 500.
Shading indicates periods in which the agent could be rewarded (on-task periods).
Model extensions and future work
As presented here, our model treats energetic resources as an energy flow from capillar-
ies to astrocytes and neurons. The simulations above provide qualitative relationships
between control, performance, and energy dynamics. It would not be difficult to cali-
brate the model in order to match known rates of glucose transfer from capillaries to
astrocytes and neurons. The energy flow could be changed to use diffusion equations
instead of liquid flow equations. Conversion of glucose to glycogen, then lactate, is
somewhat inefficient, and that inefficiency could be included in the model. The agent’s
state is currently assumed to be perfectly known by the agent, but a more realistic
approach would be to have the agent estimate its state from a crude, noisy input. This
would reflect our suggestion that fatigue is a signal of partial glycogen depletion. These
complicating factors were omitted from the current model to preserve as much simplic-
ity as possible while still providing a useful conceptual framework. Even so, the model
already provides qualitatively useful predictions (see e.g. the astrocytic glycogen levels
in Figure 6.6B, the performance trajectories in 6.6C and the presence of a performance
deficit in subsequent tasks in Figure 6.7).
6.4.1 Testable predictions
Given the model outlined above, there is a way to test whether the cognitive cost
parameter λ is greater than 0, that is, whether the objective function in our model
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should include a penalty for cognitive control. The planning-based model introduces a
tradeoff between current and future resource utilization, with no particular penalty for
current utilization over future. In contrast, a cognitive cost of λ > 0 implies a trade off
between costs and rewards in the present with no consideration of the future. These
models make different predictions in a condition where a time horizon is short or non-
existent (in other words, in which no planning is needed). One way to induce such a
scenario is to provide an immediate and abundant source of energetic resources, such
that high utilization of astrocytic glycogen is not necessary, even in conditions of high
neural activity. To do this, one could clamp an individual’s blood sugar to a high level,
such that all additional energy utilization arising from demanding cognitive processing is
provided from the blood (the capillary-neuron connection in Figure 1B) rather than the
astrocytic glycogen shunt. In this condition there are no future energetic consequences
to high neural activity. Our model predicts that in such a condition, subjects should
not show cognitive cost effects if λ = 0. In other words, all cognitive effort aversion
can be attributed to planning. If cognitive cost effects persist we would conclude that
λ > 0, meaning that cognitive effort should be treated as a cost per se.
The addition of a glycogen energy store allows us to make a prediction that would
potentially falsify either our account or the glucose-only “limited resource” account.
Suppose a subject were asked to complete a cognitively demanding task, after which
their blood sugar were clamped at a low level for a period of time. Results from [200]
suggest that astrocytic glycogen would be somewhat depleted during this period (see
Figure 6.2). Now suppose subject blood sugar was reverted to normal levels, and they
were asked to perform the task again. If performance on demanding tasks, and the
associated feeling of effort, depends on the availability of glycogen, we should expect
performance on the second task to be worse than initial performance. If, on the other
hand, glycogen does not act as an energy shunt and all energy is taken directly from
blood glucose, performance on the task should be equivalent both times. The subjective
feeling of effort could also be compared before and after clamping. This experiment is
similar in design to the dual-task paradigm mentioned above, except that it explicitly
tests the role of glycogen in task performance and subjective effort.
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6.5 Implications
The idea that the brain has a sophisticated controller for resource allocation has a
number of important implications that we believe provide a novel explanatory synthesis
of a range of phenomena. The timescale of the dynamics of glycogen depletion puts
limits on sustained neural activity. It also introduces potentially costly consequences
from operating at peak performance in one task on the performance of subsequent tasks.
We term controlling resource allocation to optimize long-term performance optimally
lazy, which amounts to incorporating future resource availability into decisions about
how to recruit neural activity to solve a particular task in the near-term. Although we
developed our model around the control of neural recruitment, we hypothesize that there
may be several important control schemes that operate at higher spatial and temporal
scales. The putative control schemes include:
1. Control by modifying gain on neural activity
This control mechanism is the focus of our paper. It optimizes energy consumption on
the timescale of a neural population that has shared glucose dynamics and could be
the target of a local neuromodulator gain control signal. This control strategy provides
a new role for excitatory and inhibitory neuromodulators, and we believe it includes
known gain control systems like attention and working memory. We expect to see
this type of resource control at the intersection of neural processes that are costly and
whose recruitment makes a graded impact on performance. While we modeled these
gains at the level of a neural population, it is more likely that gain control is structured
hierarchically, with multiple levels of resolution. For example, the concept of vigor can
be implemented by a more global gain on goal-oriented behavior. Vigor is known to be
modulated by resource availability, with rich resource availability increasing willingness
to work in humans and animals, and in the speed and variety of behaviors expressed
[220].
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2. Control by switching strategies or policies with different performance or
efficiency trade-offs.
There are also advantages to incorporating knowledge of differential costs of neural ac-
tivity to learn more metabolically efficient strategies or policies. Investments in effiency
have the largest pay-offs in frequently recurring tasks. If model-based look-ahead is in-
deed differentially costly, then efficiency may drive model-free policy learning. The idea
that energetic efficiency drives model-free learning is a significant change of viewpoint.
Model-free methods are usually justified on the basis of improved accuracy as experience
grows [79, 221]. However, congruent with efficiency driving learning, Huang et al. pro-
vide evidence that suggests later stages of motor learning are directed toward increasing
metabolic efficiency, without gains in performance [194]. More generally, varying the
weight on metabolic costs during task learning can produce a family of solutions that
can be rapidly selected between during a task to provide an alternative online control
of metabolic costs. Given a family (at least two) strategies (policies) that have differ-
ent neural costs and performance on the same task, a controller can select (or weight)
policies to trade-off performance vs. cognitive costs. The current model allows for this
possibility via the inclusion of multiple performance curves, as seen in Figure 6.3.
3. Control by modifying the distribution of glycogen across the brain.
When efficient solutions to recurrent tasks are not available (or take too long to effec-
tively learn), the brain may invest in changing the distribution and quantity of energetic
stores across the brain, either by changing locations and numbers of astrocytes and/or
the amount of glycogen stored in astrocytes. Reallocation of energetic stores constitutes
a distinctive kind of control that serves to anticipate and meet the demands of recurrent
neural activity at longer timescales. If present, it would constitute a distinctive type of
endurance learning, that would provide a basis for generalizable gains in resource de-
pendent cognitive processes like attention, working memory, look-ahead, and executive
function. It is also strongly analogous to changes in muscle glycogen stores induced by
exercise. Consistent with this idea, hypoglycemia causes lower cognitive/physical per-
formance, and we have a real need for rest after both heavy cognitive exertion similar
to physical exercise. The cognitive benefits of physical exercise may result in part from
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better metabolic regulation, and cognitive training may produce increases in glycogen
similar to the impact of physical training on muscle glycogen. Changes in resources
may underlie the pattern of cognitive gains documented in video game players, which
show general improvements in visual attention and working memory [222], while simul-
taneously providing a fundamental reason for the ubiquitous finding of lack of transfer
in most learning paradigms. Learning paradigms are almost universally conducted in
conditions where task recurrence would encourage the investment in efficient (but nec-
essarily specialized) solutions.
Considering glycogen allocation as an optimal resource allocation problem, we pre-
dict that the differential density of astrocytes and glycogen stores across the brain will
be a function of the frequency of sustained activity. Areas whose activity are infrequent
or short relative to depletion dynamics will need fewer resources than areas whose ac-
tivity is frequent and sustained. This relationship between the statistics of sustained
neural activity and glycogen stores is easily testable. In general, this predicts that the
more specific the cognitive function, the less frequent its sustained use and the more
susceptible it will be to degradation with decreases in energy availability. As sustained
functions are likely recoded in efficient ways to exploit more direct sensory-to-motor
mapping, we predict this degradation will fall most heavily on higher cognitive func-
tions. The best evidence for this idea are the patterns of loss of cognitive function with
declines in blood sugar, in which working memory, attention and executive control are
more sensitive to hypoglycemia than visual and auditory acuity or basic motor functions
[112].
4. A mechanism for the integration of energy utilization.
The model presented in this paper requires some mechanism by which the depletion
of astrocytic glycogen is translated into effort avoidance behavior. Accordingly, one
prediction of our model is that the trajectory of glycogen storage levels should be coded
neurally at a larger scale than local negative feedback due to neurotransmitter con-
centrations. This energy usage information must then be transmitted to structures
controlling cognitive effort expenditure in order for it to manifest as behavior. We do
not make a specific claim about the identity of this circuit, but the evidence presented
in the review above, combined with the explanatory power of the model presented in
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this paper, strongly suggest that it exists.
In conclusion, by viewing the allocation of metabolic resources as a control problem
with the concrete resource limitation given by the dynamics of glycogen storage and
use, we provide a family of novel explanations for a number of apparently unrelated
phenomena while simultaneously providing a rational explanation for a range of biases
and patterns in decision making. These new hypotheses are quantitative, testable, and
we hope will provide grist for the development of new explanations and interventions.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Performing a task requires information to be transmitted from the world, through the
brain, and back into the world via action. The speed and fidelity of this transmission
process is constrained by the presence of noise, the availability of energy, and the effi-
ciency of inference afforded by knowledge of task statistics. In this dissertation, we have
shown that a transmission process bounded by these constraints provides a parsimonious
and simple explanation of a wide array of behavioral phenomena, including reproducing
known ‘laws’ of human behavior such as the Hick-Hyman law and the Power Law of
Practice.
In order to quantify the relationship between transmission constraints and mea-
surable behavior, we introduced an information transmission scheme called the Bayes-
Poisson model, which is constructed using stochastic processes, Bayesian inference, and
entropy. In this model, the burden of increasing transmission efficiency is placed on
the decoder, which can increase efficiency by capturing the task statistics in a decoder
prior. In addition, the model provides a principled method of quantifying transmission
costs associated with performing tasks. We have argued that it is exactly the set of
tasks that require high transmission costs that produce the feeling of mental effort, and
that effort may be a phenomenological signal to preserve signal transmission resources.
Finally, we used the Bayes-Poisson model to understand the process of information
integration in the N-back task. By modifying the task to explicitly include statistical
structure in the pattern of responses, we demonstrated that subjects produce responses
by integrating information from multiple sources, augmenting traditional interpretations
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of N-back performance and suggesting a deep similarity between the N-back task and
cognitive control tasks.
Cognitive science is in need of both principles and parsimony. By acknowledging the
role of and constraints on information transmission in the production of behavior in the
service of a task, we have been able to produce simple and parsimonious explanations
of a wide range of phenomena.
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